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“WHEN THEY ENTER, WE ALL ENTER”:
OPENING THE DOOR TO INTERSECTIONAL 
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS BASED ON RACE AND 
DISABILITY
Alice Abrokwa*
This Article explores the intersection of race and disability in the context of 
employment discrimination, arguing that people of color with disabilities can and 
should obtain more robust relief for their harms by asserting intersectional 
discrimination claims. Professor Kimberlé Crenshaw first articulated the 
intersectionality framework by explaining that Black women can experience a form 
of discrimination distinct from that experienced by White women or Black men, 
that is, they may face discrimination as Black women due to the intersection of their 
race and gender. Likewise, people of color with disabilities can experience 
discrimination distinct from that felt by people of color without disabilities or by 
White people with disabilities due to the intersection of their race and disability. Yet 
often our legal and cultural institutions have been reluctant to acknowledge the 
intersectional experience, preferring instead to understand people by a singular trait 
like their race, gender, or disability. While courts have recognized the validity of 
intersectional discrimination claims, they have offered little guidance on how to 
articulate and prove the claims, leaving compound and complex forms of 
discrimination unaddressed. This Article thus offers an analysis of how courts and 
litigants should evaluate claims of workplace discrimination based on the intersection 
of race and disability, highlighting in particular the experience of Black disabled 
individuals. Only by fully embracing intersectionality analysis can we realize the 
potential of antidiscrimination law to remedy the harms of those most at risk of 
being denied equal opportunity.
* Attorney at the National Center for Youth Law and graduate of Harvard Law 
School and the Harvard Kennedy School. I am deeply grateful to my family, friends, and 
colleagues for their profoundly valuable insights and support, and to the editors of the 
Michigan Journal of Race and Law for their excellent suggestions and edits. I would par-
ticularly like to thank Karen Bailey, Lindsay Booker, Emily Bretz, Shaylyn Cochran, Pa-
tience Essah, Kathryn Gilbert, Kelsey Larsen, Carla Laroche, Charlotte Lanvers, Serena 
Mayeri, Candace Moss, Emily Read, Rukku Singla, and Leah Watson.
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To be intersectional is to be disruptive. The word “intersection” 
derives from the Latin intersecare, meaning to “cut asunder.”1 People who 
identify with an intersectional identity break apart our most basic ways of 
understanding the human experience and demand to be understood as 
1. Intersection, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, www.oed.com/view/Entry/
98300 (last visited June 21, 2018); see Intersect, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE,
www.oed.com/view/Entry/98296 (last visited June 21, 2018).
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whole individuals whose experiences consist of more than the sum of 
their parts.
According to Professor Kimberelé Crenshaw’s description of inter-
sectionality, some individuals are treated unequally because they are posi-
tioned directly at the crossroads of different human experiences.2 If you 
understand a Black woman only as you understand a Black person or on-
ly as you understand a woman, then you have failed to understand the 
Black woman. Because “[d]iscrimination, like traffic through an intersec-
tion, may flow in one direction, and it may flow in another,” the person 
standing in the intersection may be singularly harmed by discrimination 
coming from one of many directions or they may be harmed precisely 
because they exist where these varying forms of discrimination converge.3
Because she exists in the intersection, this forces on others the choice to 
stop and confront her reality and experience head-on or to instead barrel 
through or around her. Crenshaw’s intersectionality analysis calls for the 
former, arguing that realizing the promise of antidiscrimination law re-
quires the “inclusion of marginalized groups for whom it can be said: 
‘[w]hen they enter, we all enter.’ ”4
In the nearly three decades since Crenshaw first presented an inter-
sectionality framework highlighting the intersection of race and sex, there 
has been an increasing—though still limited—recognition in our public 
discourse of other important intersections at which people may experi-
ence discrimination, including the intersection of race and disability.5
From discussions on the identification of students of color within the 
context of special education to the interactions of police officers with 
people of color who have mental health disabilities, public awareness of 
the intersection of race and disability has matured over time.6 We now 
better appreciate that people of color with disabilities can experience 
2. See generally Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A 
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989).
3. Id. at 149.
4. Id. at 167.
5. See generally Rabia Belt, “And Then Comes Life”: The Intersection of Race, Poverty, 
and Disability in HBO’s The Wire, 13 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 1 (2012); Beth Ribet, 
Surfacing Disability Through a Critical Race Theoretical Paradigm, 2 GEO. J.L. & MOD.
CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 209 (2010); Jennifer Pokempner & Dorothy E. Roberts, Poverty, 
Welfare Reform, and the Meaning of Disability, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 425 (2001).
6. See generally Camille A. Nelson, Frontlines: Policing at the Nexus of Race and Mental 
Health, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 615 (2016); Camille A. Nelson, Racializing Disability, Dis-
abling Race: Policing Race and Mental Status, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1 (2010); Daniel J. 
Losen & Kevin G. Welner, Disabling Discrimination in our Public Schools: Comprehensive Le-
gal Challenges to Inappropriate and Inadequate Special Education Services for Minority Children,
36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407 (2001).
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complex forms of discrimination distinct from those experienced by ei-
ther people of color or people with disabilities more broadly. Further-
more, the work of Crenshaw and others prompted extensive legal schol-
arship evaluating the complexities of intersectional discrimination claims.7
However, while courts recognize the validity of intersectional discrimina-
tion claims, they have been slow to embrace intersectionality analysis.8
The case law has yet to clearly articulate how a plaintiff experiencing dis-
crimination due to their race and disability together can redress the harms 
that come from standing in this specific intersection. This lack of guid-
ance leaves such plaintiffs with an uncharted path forward, as they poten-
tially face two different legal causation standards—the “motivating factor” 
standard, which applies to racial discrimination claims, and the “but-for” 
standard, which many courts apply to disability discrimination claims.9
To help fill this gap in intersectionality analysis, this Article articu-
lates how people of color with disabilities can remedy the intersectional 
discrimination they experience, focusing on the context of employment 
discrimination. Part Two of the Article highlights the importance of ac-
knowledging intersectional discrimination based on race and disability by
examining the position of the Black body, disabled body, and Black disa-
bled body in our laws and our society. Part Three analyzes how intersec-
tional plaintiffs may navigate the applicable legal standards and prove their 
employment discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 (Title VII) and Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA). Part Three further offers examples of claims that such plaintiffs 
might bring and the remedies potentially available to them.
By focusing on the under-acknowledged legal position of people of 
color with disabilities, this Article endeavors to further the ever-critical 
goal of “recenter[ing] discrimination discourse at the intersection.”10 The 
promise of the intersectionality framework is two-fold. First, courts can-
not remedy forms of discrimination that they do not know exist, and in-
tersectional discrimination analysis usefully draws attention to distinct and 
complex forms of discrimination that would otherwise be erased.11 In-
deed, part of the harm that people at the intersection of socially marginal-
7. See Serena Mayeri, Intersectionality and Title VII: A Brief (Pre-)History, 95 B.U. L.
REV. 713, 730 (2015).
8. See id. (“[L]egal theory and scholarship on intersectionality continue to vastly out-
pace actual Title VII doctrine. To this day, there is no robust canon of intersectionality 
case law.”).
9. See infra Section III.A.1.
10. Crenshaw, supra note 2, at 167.
11. See Sumi Cho, Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw & Leslie McCall, Toward a Field of 
Intersectionality Studies: Theory, Applications, and Praxis, 38 SIGNS 785, 790-91 (2013); Ri-
bet, supra note 5, at 232-33.
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ized identities face is having their specific lived experience be unrecog-
nized or dismissed as unimportant.12 Advancing the analysis of intersec-
tional discrimination claims will serve the plaintiffs asserting these claims 
by affirming that their experience of discrimination matters and is worthy 
of redress and by allowing for remedies that are as nuanced as the various 
harms these plaintiffs have experienced.
But this effort will also serve a second, broader purpose, because 
when those who have borne the brunt of the most complex forms of dis-
crimination due to their intersectional position can access an equal op-
portunity, then we will have cleared the path for countless others. For 
example, a Black plaintiff with a disability might succeed in proving that 
she was discriminated against based on her race under Title VII and in 
proving that she was discriminated against based on her disability under 
the ADA without necessarily proving that she was discriminated against 
based on her status as a Black person with a disability.13 But if the plaintiff 
can show that she was discriminated against specifically as a Black person 
with a disability, I contend that her success in proving the intersectional 
claim will also expose any discrimination based on the underlying pro-
tected traits.14 Shedding light on those intersectional experiences that are 
most at risk of remaining unseen therefore leaves little room for any form 
of discrimination to hide. The intersectionality framework thus carries 
the potential to truly serve the purpose of antidiscrimination laws by 
opening the door to equal opportunity wide enough for all.
12. See id. See also Lecture by Kimberlé Crenshaw, Women & Power: Women, Pow-
er, and Peace (2007), https://www.eomega.org/videos/intersectional-erasure (explaining 
the concept of “intersectional erasure”).
13. Despite the dearth of case law expressly analyzing intersectional discrimination 
claims based on race and disability, the analogous case law concerning race-and-gender 
discrimination holds that such an intersectional claim is not automatically proven by evi-
dence of discrimination based singularly on race or gender. See Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 
F.3d 1551, 1562 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[W]hen a plaintiff is claiming race and sex bias, it is 
necessary to determine whether the employer discriminates on the basis of that combination
of factors, not just whether it discriminates against people of the same race or of the same 
sex.”).
14. This Article offers several examples of potential employment discrimination claims 
based on the intersection of race and disability, including one in which a restaurant refuses 
to hire Black jobseekers based on an assumption that they are more likely to be HIV-
positive and thus pose a risk to others. See infra Section III.C. If such a prospective em-
ployee in this hypothetical example succeeds in proving that they were discriminated 
against as a Black person with an actual or perceived disability, the analysis necessary for a 
court to find intersectional discrimination will arguably also uncover evidence that would 
support distinct race and disability discrimination claims. See id.
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II.  Acknowledging and Understanding the Intersection of
Race and Disability
In her pioneering work considering the intersection of race and sex 
in antidiscrimination law, Kimberelé Crenshaw explained that:
Black women can experience discrimination in ways that are 
both similar to and different from those experienced by 
[W]hite women and Black men . . . . Yet often they experi-
ence double-discrimination—the combined effects of practices 
which discriminate on the basis of race, and on the basis of 
sex. And sometimes, they experience discrimination as Black wom-
en—not the sum of race and sex discrimination, but as Black wom-
en.15
This last form of discrimination—that is, discrimination unique to Black 
women because they are Black women—was first meaningfully considered 
by federal courts in Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action Ass’n, an 
employment discrimination case in the Fifth Circuit holding that “dis-
crimination against [B]lack females can exist even in the absence of dis-
crimination against [B]lack men or [W]hite women.”16 Refusing to 
“condone a result which leaves [B]lack women without a viable Title VII 
remedy,” the court explained that “[r]ecognition of [B]lack females as a 
distinct protected subgroup . . . is the only way to identify and remedy 
discrimination directed toward [B]lack females.”17 As later courts have 
explained, “[r]ather than aiding the decisional process, the attempt to bi-
sect a person’s identity at the intersection of race and gender often dis-
torts or ignores the particular nature of their experiences.”18
Likewise, discrimination against people of color with disabilities can 
exist irrespective of discrimination against people of color without disa-
bilities or against White people with disabilities.19 People who exist at the 
intersection of race and disability experience a multi-dimensional form of 
discrimination that is continually at risk of being flattened to a single di-
15. Crenshaw, supra note 2, at 149 (emphasis added).
16. Jefferies v. Harris Cty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032 (5th Cir. 1980).
17. Id. at 1032, 1034.
18. Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1562 (9th Cir. 1994).
19. See Craig v. Yale Univ. Sch. of Med., 838 F. Supp. 2d 4, 8-9 (D. Conn. 2011) 
(holding that the plaintiff did not sufficiently state a “pure gender discrimination claim”
but did plead “sufficient facts to make out a cognizable ‘intersectional claim,’ or a ‘race
plus’ claim of discrimination against black males.”); Jeffers v. Thompson, 264 F. Supp. 2d 
314, 327 (D. Md. 2003) (holding that the plaintiff “failed to establish a prima facie case of 
pure gender discrimination” but had established “a prima facie case of composite, race-and-
gender discrimination.”).
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mension—either race or disability—due to the limitations of our collective 
understanding of intersectionality.20 Understanding race and understand-
ing disability are both difficult enough, so we often reduce the experi-
ences of disabled persons of color to being defined either by disability or 
race.21 Importantly, acknowledging the reality of intersectional discrimi-
nation does not require weighing the discrimination experienced by peo-
ple of color with disabilities against the discrimination experienced by 
others. Rather, embracing intersectionality analysis helps guard against 
the erasure of an individual’s particular experience of discrimination 
when that erasure may occur simply because the discrimination happens 
at the intersection of two comparatively better-understood identities.22
In order to apply Crenshaw’s intersectionality framework to work-
place discrimination claims based on race and disability, we must first un-
derstand the forms of discrimination present at this intersection. Accord-
ingly, the first part of this Article examines how our legal system and 
society have historically treated Black bodies, disabled bodies, and Black 
disabled bodies.23
A.  Understanding the Position of Black Bodies in our Law and Society
Whether through physical force, the pressures of poverty, or a lack 
of equal opportunity, the Black body in America has long been subject to 
a profound level of control by public and private actors.24 Writer Ta-
Nehisi Coates tackles this issue in Between the World and Me, in which he 
sets out to share with his son his own journey of answering “the question 
20. See Cho et al., supra note 11, at 790-91.
21. See Ribet, supra note 5, at 236-37 (explaining that the “intersectional pressure” to 
be “better, stronger, smarter, more effective, flawlessly capable, and apparently unharmed 
or immune to the strain of hyper-functioning” that people of color with disabilities expe-
rience “is often not fully acknowledged either in disability communities or Communities 
of Color”).
22. See id.
23. The body is a useful lens through which to understand intersectional discrimina-
tion—even though some people experience a body at odds with how they personally 
identify—because it is how we most readily understand people. This Article focuses on 
the Black body in particular because the Black body’s unique role in how America has 
developed and enforced its laws, including the Constitution, offers perhaps the clearest 
evidence that the law must recognize and endorse intersectional discrimination claims. See
infra Section II.A. I hope that others reading this article will take up the mantle of articu-
lating and expanding this analysis for other persons of color.
24. See TA-NEHISI COATES, BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME 103 (2015) (“[T]he pow-
er of the American state and the weight of an American legacy . . . necessitate that of the 
bodies destroyed every year, some wild and disproportionate number of them will be 
[B]lack.  Here is what I would like for you to know: In America, it is traditional to de-
stroy the [B]lack body—it is heritage.”).
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of how one should live within a [B]lack body.”25 Building upon the 
work of others, Coates describes Black Americans’ experience with rac-
ism as a physical assault on the body that “dislodges brains, blocks air-
ways, rips muscle, extracts organs, cracks bones, [and] breaks teeth.”26
Coates concludes that the question of how to live in a Black body is ul-
timately unanswerable, but advises his son that “the [B]lack body is the 
clearest evidence that America is the work of men.”27 Comprehensively 
cataloguing the various ways in which our legal and cultural institutions 
have exercised authority over Black bodies would be an impossible en-
deavor in the space of this Article; thus the following section highlights 
only a few such examples.
The exercise of control over the Black body in America began as 
early as the then-lawful use of African slave labor in the colonial period, 
and it played a fundamental role in the development of young America’s 
economic, political, and legal systems.28 Indeed, the development of our 
nation’s system of government depended in part on the political com-
promise that resulted in the U.S. Constitution weighing Black bodies as 
worth three-fifths the value of other humans.29 Furthermore, in order to 
sustain an economic system reliant on forced Black labor, states passed 
laws both before and after the Civil War regulating virtually every aspect 
of Black lives. Prior to the Civil War, several states enacted “Slave 
Codes” designed to curtail the liberties and opportunities of slaves. For 
instance, these Codes authorized deadly violence against slaves who re-
sisted and prohibited the act of teaching slaves how to read and write.30
After the Civil War, the former slaveholding states passed “Black Codes” 
that similarly restricted the civil liberties of former slaves through several 
means, including limiting their ability to testify in legal matters.31 “[T]he 
25. Id. at 12.
26. Id. at 10.
27. Id. at 12.
28. See generally A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND 
THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1978).
29. See Thurgood J. Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitu-
tion, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1987).
30. See, e.g., THE STATUTES AT LARGE: BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF 
VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE IN THE YEAR 1619, at 459 
(William Waller Hening ed., 1823), https://www.encyclopediavirginia.org/
_An_act_concerning_Servants_and_Slaves_1705; Bill Quigley & Maha Zaki, The Signifi-
cance of Race: Legislative Racial Discrimination in Louisiana, 1803-1865, 24 S.U. L. REV. 145,
151, 164-65 (1997).
31. See e.g., Ala. Code §§ 2680, 4231 (1867) (Alabama law allowing free Blacks and 
mixed-race persons to testify only in open court and in cases in which they or other free 
Black and mixed-raced persons were parties or had suffered an injury); LEON F.
LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM SO LONG: THE AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY 368 (reprt. 
1981) (“With the adoption of the Black Codes, the place of the ex-slave in postwar 
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key provisions were those which defined [the freedman] as an agricultural 
laborer, barred or circumscribed any alternative occupations, and com-
pelled him to work.”32 “Several of the codes also set down the hours of 
labor (from sunrise to sunset), the duties, and the behavior expected of 
[B]lack agricultural workers.”33 For example, in a model that inspired 
other towns, the city of Opelousas, Louisiana adopted an ordinance that 
policed whether and how freed Black Americans could enter and live in 
the town, limited their ability to freely assemble and worship, and pro-
hibited them from possessing weapons or selling merchandise without a 
special permit.34 As these laws illustrate, the legal subjugation of the Black 
body began at the very infancy of the United States and played a critical 
role in answering early legal questions, like who counted as a full legal 
person and what rights were available to those excluded from that per-
sonhood.
Many efforts by public and private actors to control those Black 
bodies perceived as threats to the social order have been specifically 
aimed at Black women. For example, as legal scholar Dorothy Roberts 
explains, “[t]he systematic, institutionalized denial of reproductive free-
dom has uniquely marked Black women’s history in America.”35 “Black 
women’s earliest experience in America was one of brutal denial of au-
tonomy over reproduction.”36 Not only was the rape of a female slave 
not a criminal offense,37 but slave masters held an “economic stake in 
bonded women’s fertility,” as Black women were expected to birth fu-
ture slaves.38 Black women were made to withstand the grueling physical 
demands of slavery even during their pregnancies.39 In order to whip 
pregnant slaves without harming the children who would later be born as 
property, Southern slaveholders “forced women to lie face down in a de-
pression in the ground while they were whipped.”40
However, when these slaveholders no longer stood to gain finan-
cially from Black fertility in the aftermath of Emancipation, the potential 
southern society had been fixed in law, his mobility checked, his bargaining power sharp-
ly reduced, and his rights of appeal hedged with difficulties.”). See also David Martin, The 
Birth of Jim Crow in Alabama 1865-1896, 13 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 184, 190 (1993).
32. LITWACK, supra note 31, at 366.
33. Id. at 367.
34. Id. at 368.
35. DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND 
THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 4 (1997).
36. Id. at 6.
37. Id. at 29. See id. at 29-33.
38. Id. at 4. See also id. at 22-55.
39. Id. at 46 (“[M]ost expectant mothers received little or no respite from their gruel-
ing work load until the final months of pregnancy.”).
40. Id. at 39.
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of Black women to create more Black bodies became a threat rather than 
an asset.41 In the first half of the twentieth century, “[t]he demise of Jim 
Crow had ironically opened the doors of state institutions to Blacks, who 
took the place of poor [W]hites as the main target of the eugenicist’s 
scalpel.”42 Though institutionalized Black women and men were both 
subject to involuntary sterilization laws continuing through the 1940s, 
“[a]s mandatory sterilization laws were repealed across the country, Black 
women fell victim to widespread sterilization abuse at the hands of gov-
ernment-paid doctors.”43 Sterilization became a common form of birth 
control by the 1960s and 1970s, and medical providers paid by the gov-
ernment to provide reproductive care routinely gave Black women un-
necessary hysterectomies without their knowledge or informed consent, 
in part so that medical residents could practice their skills.44 Some “gov-
ernment-sponsored family planning programs not only encouraged Black 
women to use birth control but coerced them into being sterilized” by 
threatening to take away their access to medical care or welfare benefits.45
These practices were sustained by stereotypes painting Black mothers as, 
among other things, immoral, sexually deviant, negligent, ignorant, dom-
ineering, lazy, and parasitic.46 These efforts to control the reproduction of 
Black women’s bodies thus persisted following slavery, at least in part due 
to a cultural imagining of Black women as “responsible for the menace 
that Blacks posed for American social order.”47
The Black male body has also been subject to a gender-specific 
form of violence and control, largely due to the enduring fear that 
“[B]lack men would, whenever possible, rape [W]hite women.”48 This 
fear was based not only on beliefs that Black men were primitive and de-
generate, but also on a judgment about the presumed sexual laxity of
Black women. One nineteenth-century historian argued that “Black men 
lacked any understanding of sexual violation because their women were 
always eager to engage in sex.”49 Therefore, one main justification for the 
state anti-miscegenation laws prohibiting interracial sexual and marital re-
41. See ROBERTS, supra note 35, at 56 (“While slave masters forced Black women to 
bear children for profit, more recent policies have sought to reduce Black women’s fertili-
ty.”).
42. Id. at 89.
43. Id. at 89; see id. at 88-90.
44. See id. at 90-96.
45. Id. at 56, 92-94.
46. See generally id. at 8-21.
47. ROBERTS, supra note 35, at 12.
48. N. Jeremi Duru, The Central Park Five, the Scottsboro Boys, and the Myth of the Bestial 
Black Man, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1315, 1324 (2004). See also SUSAN BURCH & HANNAH 
JOYNER, UNSPEAKABLE: THE STORY OF JUNIUS WILSON 31 (2007).
49. ROBERTS, supra note 35, at 11.
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lationships—laws that were more vigorously enforced against Black men 
than others—was to guard against the rape of White women by Black 
men.50
The state’s reaction to this presumed threat is sharply illustrated by 
the infamous 1931 Scottsboro case, in which nine Black boys were accused 
of raping two White women on an Alabama train, and all but one were 
sentenced to die.51 The local deputy sheriff effected arrest of the “Scotts-
boro boys” by deputizing a “posse comitatus,”52 calling together a group 
of “fifty men, armed with shotguns, rifles, and pistols” with the mission 
to “capture every Negro on the train.”53 In essence, when the state alone 
lacked the resources to respond to the alleged rape of White women by 
Black boys, it conjured an armed group of citizens to help control these 
young Black bodies. Nearly sixty years later, when five Black and Latino 
boys were convicted of raping a White female jogger in Central Park af-
ter being pressured by the police to confess, the state no longer needed to 
rely on posses of armed citizens to carry out its work.54 It was instead able 
to secure the conviction of all five boys—each of which was later vacated 
when DNA testing identified another person as the rapist—with the ap-
proval of another kind of posse, as media reports and public opinion lik-
ened the boys to wild animals compelled to savagely hunt White wom-
en.55 As with the examples concerning Black women, these cases reveal 
the comprehensive efforts of legal and societal institutions to control 
those Black bodies considered threatening.
Arguably the most impactful form of state control over Black bodies 
in modern America has been in the area of mass incarceration. Black 
Americans’ experience with mass incarceration informs Coates’ warning 
50. See BURCH & JOYNER, supra note 48, at 31 (explaining that the film THE BIRTH 
OF A NATION argued that “[m]iscegenation . . . was the ultimate goal of the [B]lack legis-
lators. And when miscegenation could not be carried out by legal means, violence and 
rape could accomplish that same end.”); Kenneth Lay, Sexual Racism: A Legacy of Slavery,
13 NAT’L. BLACK L.J. 165, 166 (1993) (“All were phrased so that intermarriage between a 
White person and a member of the other designated groups was prohibited; the statutes 
generally did not restrict intermarriage between members of races other than Whites.”); 
Julie Novkov, Racial Constructions: The Legal Regulation of Miscegenation in Alabama, 1890-
1934, 20 L. & HIST. REV. 225, 231 (2002) (“Interracial sex was not prohibited per se, as 
this could have posed problems for [W]hite men, but the state made clear its horror at the 
thought that [B]lack men might partake of forcible sex with [W]hite women.”).
51. See generally Michael J. Klarman, Scottsboro, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 379 (2009).
52. See Patterson v. State, 224 Ala. 531, 536 (1932); Klarman, supra note 51, at 380; 
Posse Comitatus, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A group of citizens who 
are called together to help the sheriff keep the peace or conduct rescue operations.”).
53. Douglas O. Linder, Without Fear or Favor: Judge James Edwin Horton and the Trial of 
the “Scottsboro Boys,” 68 UMKC L. REV. 549, 550 (2000).
54. See Duru, supra note 48, at 1316-17.
55. See id. at 1347-49.
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to his son that “the police departments of your country have been en-
dowed with the authority to destroy your body.”56 Irrespective of the 
race of any particular police officer, Coates advises that “what matters is 
the system that makes your body breakable.”57 This can be seen in the 
shift in the enforcement of drug laws that caused the U.S. prison popula-
tion to explode in the 1980s and 1990s, with especially stark consequenc-
es for the communities of color who were policed and prosecuted most 
vigorously.58 The percentage of Black women behind bars for drug of-
fenses increased by a staggering 828 percent between 1986 and 1991.59 A
2003 report by the Bureau of Justice Statistics found that Black men were 
more than twice as likely as Hispanic men and more than six times as 
likely as White men to go to prison during their lifetimes.60 The report 
warned that, if incarceration rates remained unchanged, about one in 
three Black men were expected to go to prison in their lifetime, as com-
pared to one in six Hispanic men and one in seventeen White men.61
Despite this warning, these troubling statistics are our current reality.62
While Black Americans constitute roughly 13 percent of the U.S. popu-
lation,63 they make up roughly 38 percent of the federal prison popula-
tion.64 Black children are now six times more likely than White children 
to have or have had an incarcerated parent.65 Moreover, the criminal legal 
56. COATES, supra note 25, at 9.
57. Id. at 18.
58. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 96-103 (2012). (“Although the majority of illegal drug users 
and dealers nationwide are white, three-fourths of all people imprisoned for drug offenses 
have been [B]lack or Latino.”).
59. Dorothy Roberts, Prison, Foster Care, and the Systemic Punishment of Black Mothers,
59 UCLA L. REV. 1474, 1480 (2012).
60. Thomas P. Bonczar, Prevalence of Imprisonment in the U.S. Population, 1974-2001,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 197976, at 1 (2003), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/piusp01.pdf.
61. Id.
62. See FACT SHEET: TRENDS IN U.S. CORRECTIONS 5, THE SENTENCING 
PROJECT (2017), http://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Trends-in-
US-Corrections.pdf.
63. Quick Facts: United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045217 (last visited June 21, 2018).
64. Inmate Race, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://
www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate_race.jsp (last visited June 21, 2018).
65. LEILA MORSY & RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, ECON. POL’Y INST., MASS 
INCARCERATION AND CHILDREN’S OUTCOMES 1 (2016), http://www.epi.org/
files/pdf/118615.pdf; Valerie Strauss, Mass Incarceration of African Americans Affects the Racial 
Achievement Gap-Report, WASH. POST (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2017/03/15/mass-incarceration-of-african-americans-
affects-the-racial-achievement-gap-report/?utm_term=.d61c11df58a7.
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system’s control over Black bodies is not confined to the accused and the 
incarcerated. Attorney and activist Bryan Stevenson describes in his 
memoir the experience of being strip-searched on his way to visit a client 
condemned to death simply because the prison guard refused to accept 
that Stevenson, a Black male, was indeed an attorney.66 This account ex-
emplifies the kind of racialized intrusion on bodily integrity that can as-
sault one’s dignity even without the physical violence that Coates de-
scribes.
In contrast with the legal diminution of the importance of the Black 
body, our cultural understanding of the Black body has generally consist-
ed of an exaggerated image of the Black body as larger-than-life, strong-
er-than-human, and preternaturally dangerous.67 This is reflected in the 
description of teenager Michael Brown by the officer who killed him as 
having nearly superhuman size and strength.68 It is reflected in the re-
search indicating that Black boys and girls are seen as less innocent than 
other children and are perceived as being older than they are.69 It is re-
flected in the research indicating that White medical providers underes-
timate the pain experienced by Black patients, and thus under-prescribe 
and under-diagnose medical conditions, because they perceive Black pa-
tients as less sensitive to pain than White patients.70 The common thread 
66. BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST MERCY: A STORY OF JUSTICE AND REDEMPTION 194-
95 (2014).
67. See generally Kurt Hugenberg & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Facing Prejudice: Implicit 
Prejudice and the Perception of Facial Threat, 14 PSYCHOL. SCI. 640 (2003); Jenessa R. 
Shapiro et al., Following in the Wake of Anger: When Not Discriminating is Discriminating, 35 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1356 (2009) (comparing the perceptions of Black 
or White individuals as either friendly or threatening based on their facial expressions); 
Wilson et al., Racial Bias in Judgments of Physical Size and Formidability: From Size to Threat,
113 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 59-80, 74 (2017) (“Non-Black perceivers overesti-
mated young Black men as taller, heavier, stronger, more muscular, and more capable of 
causing physical harm than young White men.”).
68. See Emily Wax-Thibodeaux, Wilson Said the Unarmed Teen Looked Like a ‘Demon.’
Experts Say His Testimony Was Dehumanizing and ‘Super-Humanizing,’ WASH. POST (Nov. 
25, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/11/25/
wilson-said-the-unarmed-teen-looked-like-a-demon-experts-say-his-testimony-was-
dehumanizing-and-super-humanizing/?utm_term=.0c900bfa0c64 (discussing Officer 
Darren Wilson’s grand jury testimony that Michael Brown looked like a “demon” and 
that Wilson “felt like a 5-year-old holding onto Hulk Hogan” when he grabbed Brown).
69. REBECCA EPSTEIN ET AL., GEO. L. CTR. ON POVERTY & INEQ., GIRLHOOD 
INTERRUPTED: THE ERASURE OF BLACK GIRLS’ CHILDHOOD 8 (2017), https://www.
law.georgetown.edu/poverty-inequality-center/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2017/08/
girlhood-interrupted.pdf; Philip Atiba Goff et al., The Essence of Innocence: Consequences of 
Dehumanizing Black Children, 106 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 526, 536 (2014).
70. See generally Kelly M. Hoffman et al., Racial Bias in Pain Assessment and Treatment 
Recommendations, and False Beliefs About Biological Differences Between Blacks and Whites, 113 
PNAS 4296 (2016) (finding that individuals with some medical training “hold and may 
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in these observations is that the American imagination instinctively con-
siders Black bodies as more likely to hurt and less likely to be hurt than 
other bodies.
In response to this instinct, several television and film portrayals 
have sought to present the Black body’s perceived superhuman strength 
and imperviousness to physical pain as signaling more dignity than dan-
ger. Netflix’s retelling of the story of bulletproof comic book figure Luke 
Cage is a prime example—his formerly incarcerated Black body is dis-
patched for the public good and is literally unbreakable.71 And in the hor-
ror/thriller film Get Out, the Black male protagonist is the subject of an 
effort by his White girlfriend’s family to auction off and inhabit his 
healthy Black body for the purpose of achieving a form of disability-free 
immortality; the family ultimately sells access to his body to a friend seek-
ing to overcome blindness.72 The protagonist survives by killing the fami-
ly, and the film concludes with a police car slowly driving towards him 
while he leans over his girlfriend’s body.73 Primed to expect the Black 
body as a suspect in the eyes of state authority, the audience is instead of-
fered a scene of resilience in the face of racial terror, as the driver of the 
police car is a friend who believes the protagonist’s account—this particu-
lar Black body is a survivor of what Coates describes as “the sheer terror 
of disembodiment.”74
This context of how Black bodies have been and continue to be 
understood in the American legal system and culture is fundamental to a 
robust understanding of what lies at the intersection of Blackness and dis-
ability. As the above examination of the Black body reveals, the historical 
and ongoing efforts to control Black bodies reflect pervasive and 
longstanding fears surrounding the Black body, from the feared loss of the 
Black body as a source of forced labor to the presumption of Black dan-
gerousness. In order to better understand the discrimination that an indi-
vidual may face at the intersection of race and disability, this Article turns 
next to an examination of the disabled body.
use false beliefs about biological differences” in Black and White patients to inform medi-
cal judgments); Astha Singhal et al., Racial-Ethnic Disparities in Opioid Prescriptions at Emer-
gency Department Visits for Conditions Commonly Associated with Prescription Drug Abuse, 11 
PLOS ONE, Aug. 8, 2016, at 1 (finding significant racial-ethnic disparities in opioid pre-
scriptions for certain medical diagnoses); Sophie Trawalter et al., Racial Bias in Perceptions 
of Others’ Pain, 7 PLOS ONE, Nov. 2012, at 1 (finding that “people assume a priori that 
Blacks feel less pain than do Whites).
71. See Lawrence Ware, Luke Cage: A Bulletproof Black Man in the Black Lives Matter 
Era, THE ROOT (Sept. 30, 2016), http://www.theroot.com/luke-cage-a-bulletproof-
black-man-in-the-black-lives-m-1790857029.
72. GET OUT (Universal Pictures 2017).
73. Id.
74. COATES, supra note 25; see GET OUT, supra note 72.
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B. Understanding the Position of Disabled Bodies in our Law and Society
As explained in this Section, the exercise of control over disabled 
bodies by American legal and cultural institutions stems from a similarly 
complex set of public and private attitudes.75 These attitudes—ranging 
from fear, disdain, paternalism, indifference, pity, and disgust—
continually shift over time, sometimes amplifying and sometimes mitigat-
ing one another.76 The use of public authority and public institutions to 
control disabled bodies, however, remains constant.77
Justice Marshall outlined the shifting attitudes towards disabled bod-
ies in America in his partial concurrence in City of Cleburne, Texas v. 
Cleburne Living Center.78 While the majority holds that equal protection 
claims asserting discrimination based on disability are subject only to ra-
tional basis review,79 Justice Marshall writes separately in defense of 
heightened scrutiny, in the process describing the “lengthy and tragic his-
tory . . . of segregation and discrimination” that individuals with intellec-
tual disabilities have faced in America.80 Justice Marshall first describes a 
period of ambivalence during much of the nineteenth century in which 
“mental retardation was viewed as neither curable nor dangerous and the 
retarded81 were largely left to their own devices.”82 However, by the end 
of that century and into the next, public attitudes shifted to a disdain and 
fear inspired by Social Darwinism and eugenics.83 “[L]eading medical au-
thorities and others began to portray the ‘feeble-minded’ as a ‘menace to 
society and civilization . . . responsible in a large degree for many, if not 
all, of our social problems.’ ”84 This change in attitude ushered in a “re-
gime of state-mandated segregation and degradation” that sought to con-
trol disabled bodies through “[m]assive custodial institutions . . . built to 
warehouse the retarded for life” and prevent their reproduction.85 States 
ratified the effort to exclude and control intellectually disabled persons by 
75. See infra Sections II.B. and II.C.
76. See, e.g., infra notes 80, 82-86 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., infra pp. 34-36.
78. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 455-78 (1985) (Mar-
shall, J.) (dissenting in part, concurring in part).
79. Id. at 446 (White, J.) (plurality opinion).
80. Id. at 461 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
81. Over time, the pejorative nature of the word “retarded” has become more widely 
understood and acknowledged. Outside of direct quotes, this Article therefore uses the 
terms “intellectual disability” or “cognitive disability.”
82. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 461 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
83. See id. at 461-62.
84. Id. at 462 (internal citations omitted).
85. Id.
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passing laws voiding and criminalizing their marriages, forcing their steri-
lizations, denying their citizenship status, and excluding them from public 
spaces like the voting booth and the schoolhouse.86 Although these laws 
generally treated individuals with intellectual disabilities as threatening 
because of their perceived weaknesses rather than because of perceived 
superhuman strengths as with Black Americans, the effect and purpose of 
the laws was the same—to exert state control over otherwise uncontrol-
lable bodies.
As scholar Douglas Baynton points out, disability was treated with 
such disdain at the turn of the twentieth century that the very concept of 
disability was considered justification for denying full citizenship to those 
distinguished as “other,” regardless of whether they indeed had a disabil-
ity.87 Baynton argues that disability played a key role during “the three 
great citizenship debates of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: 
women’s suffrage, African American freedom and civil rights, and the re-
striction of immigration,” in that “disability was called on to clarify and 
define who deserved, and who was deservedly excluded from, citizen-
ship.”88 For example, “one of the rhetorical tactics of suffrage opponents 
was to point to the physical, intellectual, and psychological flaws of 
women, their frailty, irrationality, and emotional excesses.”89 Anti-
suffragists argued both that “women had disabilities that made them inca-
pable of using the franchise responsibly, and that because of their frailty 
women would become disabled if exposed to the rigors of political par-
ticipation.”90
Similarly, “[t]he most common disability argument for slavery was 
simply that African Americans lacked sufficient intelligence to participate 
or compete on an equal basis in society with [W]hite Americans.”91 Pro-
ponents of slavery further argued that “African Americans, because of 
their inherent physical and mental weaknesses, were prone to become 
disabled under conditions of freedom and equality.”92 Medical providers 
at the time even asserted that African slaves and their descendants were 
vulnerable to purported mental illnesses like drapetomania, “a condition 
that caused slaves to run away,” and dysaesthesia aethiopis, a condition 
86. See id. at 463-64.
87. See Douglas C. Baynton, Disability and the Justification of Inequality in American Histo-
ry, in THE NEW DISABILITY HISTORY: AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 33, 33 (Paul K. Long-
more & Lauri Umansky eds., 2001).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 41.
90. Id. at 41-42.
91. Id. at 37.
92. Id.
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which “resulted in a desire to avoid work and generally to cause mis-
chief.”93
Furthermore, the exclusion of people with disabilities was so fun-
damental to national immigration laws at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury through the beginning of the twentieth century that “[t]he detection 
of physical disabilities was a major aspect of the immigration inspector’s 
work.”94 Not only did “people with disabilities constitute a distinct cate-
gory of persons unwelcome in the United States,” but also “the charge 
that certain ethnic groups were mentally and physically deficient was in-
strumental in arguing for their exclusion.”95 This historical use of disabil-
ity to justify the legal exclusion and marginalization of individuals with 
and without disabilities reveals a substantial level of derision towards even 
the concept of disability.
One of the most sweeping efforts at state control over disabled bod-
ies arose from the eugenics movement of the twentieth century, which 
sought to prevent people with disabilities from procreating based on the 
paternalistic belief that they could not be trusted to adequately care for 
their children, and that society would be better off if there were fewer 
disabled bodies to care for.96 As part of this movement, more than thirty 
states passed laws authorizing the involuntary sterilization of individuals 
with disabilities.97 A 2012 report by the National Council on Disability 
reveals that the legacy of this attitude towards individuals with disabilities 
lives on in family law. Even now, “[p]arents with disabilities and their 
children are overly, and often inappropriately, referred to child welfare
services and, once involved, are permanently separated at disproportion-
ately high rates.”98 Accordingly, removal rates in child welfare cases 
where one parent has a psychiatric disability range from seventy to eighty 
percent.99 Furthermore, “two-thirds of dependency statutes allow the 
court to reach the determination that a parent is unfit (a determination 
necessary to terminate parental rights) on the basis of the parent’s disabil-
ity.”100 Individuals with disabilities face further barriers to growing their 
93. Baynton, supra note 87, at 38.
94. Id. at 46.
95. Id. at 47 (emphasis omitted).
96. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). See also Ora Prilleltensky, A Ramp to 
Motherhood: The Experiences of Mothers with Physical Disabilities, 21 SEXUALITY &
DISABILITY 21, 22–23 (2003).
97. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, ROCKING THE CRADLE: ENSURING THE RIGHTS 
OF PARENTS WITH DISABILITIES AND THEIR CHILDREN 43 (2012).
98. Id. at 18.
99. Id. at 14.
100. Id.
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families through adoption or assisted reproductive technologies.101 The 
profundity of state control over disabled bodies in the area of family law 
cannot be overstated. These laws police not only what disabled bodies are 
permitted to do, but whether disabled bodies are permitted to exist.102
America’s criminal legal system further manifests an exertion of state 
control over disabled bodies, stemming from a combination of indiffer-
ence, fear, and contempt. After decades of efforts to move people with 
disabilities out of institutional settings like mental hospitals and into their 
communities, these individuals instead have been disproportionately insti-
tutionalized in jails and prisons because many states lack adequate systems 
for providing community-based care.103 Individuals in prison are thus four 
times as likely, and individuals in jail are six times as likely to report a 
cognitive disability as individuals in the general population.104 One in five 
persons in prison has a serious mental illness.105 Once jailed or incarcer-
ated, individuals with disabilities are routinely segregated in solitary set-
tings, subject to mistreatment or abuse, and denied necessary accommo-
dations or modifications.106
The overrepresentation of individuals with disabilities, particularly 
mental health disabilities, in the U.S. criminal legal system reflects both 
an indifference about the lack of adequate supports for and the potency of 
stereotypes and generalizations about such individuals. Many jailed or in-
carcerated persons with disabilities are exposed to the criminal legal sys-
tem not because they have committed serious crimes, but because they 
are arrested for “crimes of survival” that reflect inadequate community-
based services and the criminalization of the symptoms of their disabili-
ties.107 For individuals with a mental health disability, this criminalization 
is bolstered by stereotypes that they are dangerous, “responsible for their 
101. See generally id. at 179-227 (overview of access to adoption system and assisted re-
productive technologies).
102. See generally Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, ABC RELIGION & ETHICS, A Habitable 
World: Eugenics and Why We Should Conserve Disability (Mar. 22, 2018), 
http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2017/03/21/4639875.htm (addressing the ques-
tion of “why disabled people should be in the world”).
103. See REBECCA VALLAS, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, DISABLED BEHIND BARS: THE 
MASS INCARCERATION OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES IN AMERICA’S JAILS AND PRISONS
(2016).
104. Id. at 2.
105. Id.
106. See generally, RACHAEL SEEVERS, AVID PRISON PROJECT MAKING HARD TIME 
HARDER: PROGRAMMATIC ACCOMMODATIONS FOR INMATES WITH DISABILITIES 
UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (June 22, 2016); see VALLAS, supra note 
103, at 11.
107. See Matt Ford, America’s Largest Mental Hospital is a Jail, THE ATLANTIC (June 8, 
2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/americas-largest-mental-
hospital-is-a-jail/395012/.
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illness or otherwise blameworthy,” and “faking or exaggerating their 
condition.”108 American society persists in this imagining of individuals 
with mental health disabilities as atypically violent even though research 
shows that “the vast majority of people with mental disorders do not en-
gage in violence” and that they are “much more likely to be victims of vi-
olent crime than the general population.”109
The above mix of indifference and disdain is not confined to indi-
viduals with mental health disabilities. For example, in his dissent in At-
kins v. Virginia, in which the majority held that capital punishment for the 
intellectually disabled is unconstitutional, Justice Scalia argued that intel-
lectual disability “can readily be feigned” by defendants seeking to “turn 
the process of capital trial into a game.”110 Justice Scalia further dismissed 
the ways in which having an intellectual disability may contribute to 
wrongful imprisonment or execution111 and instead cast suspicion that 
those who raise the issue of their intellectual disability may be duplic-
itous. These attitudes help sustain the systemic segregation and institu-
tionalization of individuals with disabilities in our nation’s jails and pris-
ons.
Even efforts to vindicate the legal rights of persons with disabilities 
rely in part on a perception of disabled bodies as objects to be pitied for 
their brokenness. One prime example is in tort litigation, where often 
“[p]laintiffs’ lawyers believe that they must arouse the jury’s pity in order 
to succeed in the case and they think that images of plaintiffs’ impair-
ments will help them to do that.”112 “As a result, most trial lawyers devel-
op trial themes that portray plaintiffs’ bodies in negative ways,” using 
themes such as “ ‘[s]he is a prisoner in her own body,’ ” and “ ‘[s]he used 
to be so beautiful. All of her friends envied her. Now they pity her.’ ”113
Research by Professors Samuel Bagenstos and Margo Schlanger, among 
others, reveals that, in jurisdictions that allow monetary damages to com-
pensate plaintiffs for the “loss of enjoyment of life,” some courts “permit 
108. Elizabeth F. Emens, The Sympathetic Discriminator: Mental Illness, Hedonic Costs, and 
the ADA, 94 GEO. L.J. 399, 416-17 (2006).
109. Paul S. Appelbaum, Public Safety, Mental Disorders, and Guns, 70 JAMA PSYCHIATRY 
565, 565 (2013) (emphasis added).
110. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 353 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
111. Compare id. at 320-21 (majority opinion) (explaining that intellectually disabled 
defendants “face a special risk of wrongful execution” due to factors like “the possibility 
of false confessions,” a lessened ability to meaningfully assist their counsel, and a “de-
meanor [that] may create an unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their crimes”), 
with id. at 352 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that “a similar ‘special risk’ could be said to 
exist for just plain stupid people, inarticulate people, even ugly people”).
112. Anne Bloom & Paul Steven Miller, Blindsight: How We See Disabilities in Tort Liti-
gation, 86 WASH. L. REV. 709, 724 (2011).
113. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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a jury to presume that plaintiffs with disabilities will experience less pleas-
ure in their life,” and thus award damages on that basis.114 Moreover, 
“[b]ecause plaintiffs in tort litigation frequently seek compensation for 
bodily injuries, the references [in tort case law] to ‘making the plaintiff 
whole’ suggest that plaintiffs’ bodies are not ‘whole’ without the relief.”115
As a result of this framing, the assessment of tort damages to compensate 
for the defendant’s wrongful conduct centers on the perceived wrongful-
ness of the plaintiff’s body. And in the case of the controversial tort 
claims for a “wrongful birth” or a “wrongful life,” the presentation of 
disabled bodies as “wrong” by virtue of their very existence comes from 
the parents of severely disabled children or from those children them-
selves.116 While this perception of disabled bodies in tort litigation may 
help ensure that some plaintiffs are compensated, it reinforces our defini-
tional understanding of disability as a deficiency relative to the nondisa-
bled body. Under this view, a defendant’s conduct that causes a disabling 
condition deserves compensation because the disability signals the ab-
sence of some meaningful aspect of human life. Yet, as autism advocate 
Amanda Baggs has explained, “[b]eing seen in light of the ghost of who 
you were expected to be is a kind of emotional violence for many disa-
bled people.”117
America’s cultural spaces have further treated disabled bodies with a 
sense of bewilderment. Curiosity about how people with disabilities nav-
igate the world has led American society to treat disabled bodies as spec-
tacle, from staring at the person who manifests symptoms of mental illness 
on the street to placing individuals with physical disabilities on display as 
“freak show” acts.118 Yet discomfort with the visual presentation of disa-
114. See generally Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic 
Adaptation, and Disability, 60 VAND. L. REV. 745 (2007); see Bloom & Miller, supra note 
112, at 720-21.
115. Bloom & Miller, supra note 112, at 727.
116. See, e.g., Catherine Palo, Causes of Action for Wrongful Birth or Wrongful Life, 23 
C.O.A.2D 55 (2017). “Wrongful birth actions are brought by parents to recover for the 
birth of an unhealthy child. The parents’ right to recover is based on the defendant’s neg-
ligent deprivation of the parents’ right not to conceive the child or to prevent the child’s
birth.” Id. “Wrongful life actions are brought by unhealthy children to recover for having 
been born. The child’s right to recover is based on the defendant’s negligent deprivation 
of the right of the parents of the child not to conceive the child or to prevent the child’s
birth.” Id. See generally Jillian T. Stein, Backdoor Eugenics: The Troubling Implications of Cer-
tain Damages Awards in Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Claims, 40 SETON HALL L. REV.
1117 (2010) (describing courts’ resistance to recognizing wrongful birth and wrongful life 
actions).
117. ANDREW SOLOMON, FAR FROM THE TREE: PARENTS, CHILDREN AND THE 
SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 238 (2012).
118. See generally Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, Staring at the Other, 25 DISABILITY 
STUD. Q. (2005), http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/610/787 [hereinafter Garland-
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bility also led cities like San Francisco and Chicago to pass “ugly laws” in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries aimed at removing from 
public view those deemed too unsightly due to their disabilities.119
Whether presented as spectacle or hidden away as unsightly, the per-
ceived “burden” of disabled bodies is that they present a problem to be 
dealt with—an accommodation or modification that must be made or re-
fused—and I contend that the effort to avoid this sense of obligation has 
historically led us to engage in practices that erase the need to accommo-
date disability.120 As Professor Rosemarie Garland-Thomson has described 
this paradox, “the history of disabled people in the Western world is in 
part the history of being on display, of being visually conspicuous while 
being politically and socially erased.”121
This brief examination of how individuals with disabilities have 
been treated by America’s legal and cultural systems highlights the pub-
lic’s varied attitudes towards people with disabilities. Additionally, this 
history exposes an uncomfortable truth about individuals without disabili-
ties: that we have collectively warehoused, institutionalized, obscured, 
and preempted the existence of disabled bodies at least in part because 
erasing disabled bodies can also erase discomfort—or fear, pity, contempt, 
disgust, or indifference—towards those who present as atypical in some 
way. Because this understanding of disability is further complicated by 
race, the following section examines Black Americans’ experience with 
disability in particular.
Thomson, Staring at the Other]; PAMELA NEWKIRK, SPECTACLE: THE ASTONISHING LIFE 
OF OTA BENGA (2015); Jess Waggoner, “Oh say can you ____”: Race and Mental Disability 
in Performances of Citizenship, 10 J. OF LITERARY & CULTURAL DISABILITY STUD. 87, 93 
(2016) (“Since the mid-nineteenth century, microcephalic bodies have attracted notoriety 
through the traveling freak show. Entertainers were billed as an atavistic version of the 
modern human (‘The Missing Link’), a wonder of human form (‘The Pinhead’), or an 
unintelligible creature (‘The What Is It?’). This combination of small stature, a small skull, 
and intellectual disability places the microcephalic performer at the intersection of dis-
courses on physical and mental disability.”).
119. See SUSAN M. SCHWEIK, THE UGLY LAWS: DISABILITY IN PUBLIC (2009). For in-
stance, in 1881, Chicago’s city code provided that, “[a]ny person who is diseased, 
maimed, mutilated, or in any way deformed, so as to be an unsightly or disgusting object, 
or an improper person to be allowed in or on the streets, highways, thoroughfares, or 
public places in this city, shall not therein or thereon expose himself to public view, un-
der the penalty of a fine of $1 [about $20 today] for each offense.” Id. at 1-2 (second al-
teration in original).
120. See Ribet, supra note 5, at 233, 237-38, 242, 244 (discussing “the [presumed] social 
and economic burden or cost of letting disabled people into social institutions, and the 
social, personal, and economic consequences of keeping disabled people out.”).
121. Garland-Thomson, Staring at the Other, supra note 1188.
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C.  Understanding the Position of Black Disabled Bodies in our 
Law and Society
While Black bodies and disabled bodies experience many similar 
forms of discrimination, acknowledging the specific discrimination that 
occurs due to the intersection of race and disability is critical to safe-
guarding the legal rights—and the lives—of people of color with disabili-
ties. This acknowledgment requires not only examining what happens to 
those in the intersection, but also examining how they got there. Ac-
cordingly, this Section first discusses the “social model” of disability, 
which involves recognizing the role that race, poverty, and other factors 
play in the development of disabling conditions and in society’s treatment 
of individuals with disabilities.122 This Section then highlights examples of 
the forms of discrimination that individuals may experience once they ar-
rive at the intersection of race and disability. These examples illustrate 
that Black disabled bodies, like others who experience intersectional dis-
crimination, are continually at risk of having their complex experiences 
flattened to being characterized either race or disability, leaving those indi-
viduals vulnerable to discrimination based on the disregarded identity 
with no path for recourse.
First, the social model of understanding disability urges us to con-
sider the wide range of factors that can cause disabling conditions and in-
fluence how society treats people with disabilities.123 While the medical 
model focuses on clinical diagnoses that “characterize a physical or mental 
difference as a deviation from the norm,”124 the social model “defines dis-
ability as a relationship between people with impairments and broader 
social and economic forces.”125 The social model thus considers the more 
useful understanding of disability to be one that evaluates how society re-
acts to physical or mental impairments, highlighting “the role of envi-
ronment, systems, attitudes, policy, and law, in rendering members of the 
population disadvantaged.”126
One key aspect of the social model is that it calls for a recognition 
that “race is correlated with an increased risk for ill-health and disability,” 
such that, “[a]t every level of income, African Americans experience [a] 
shorter life expectancy and poorer health outcomes.”127 According to 
122. See generally Pokempner & Roberts, supra note 5; Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordina-
tion, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 427-32 (2000).
123. See Pokempner & Roberts, supra note 5, at 426.
124. Id. at 426 n.7 (internal citations omitted).
125. Id. (quoting Tom Shakespeare, What Is a Disabled Person?, in DISABILITY, DIVERS-
ABILITY, AND LEGAL CHANGE 25 (Melinda Jones & Lea Ann B. Marks eds., 1999)).
126. Id. (quoting Shakespeare, supra note 125, at 29).
127. Id. at 435 (emphasis added).
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scholars Jennifer Pokempner and Dorothy Roberts, “[t]his racial factor in 
disability stems partly from institutional racism that creates barriers to ap-
propriate medical care and insurance.”128 This disparity is also attributable 
to “racism in the job market and housing [that] expose[s] African Ameri-
cans to more health risks,” and to “conscious or unconscious discrimina-
tion by doctors against [B]lack patients.”129 For example, a study of expo-
sure to lead poisoning—which can lead to developmental, cognitive, and 
behavioral disorders in children—conducted in Chicago neighborhoods 
found that “Black and Hispanic neighborhoods exhibited extraordinarily 
high rates of lead toxicity compared to White neighborhoods.”130 One 
consequence of “the color of poverty in America” is that, starting from 
childhood, Black Americans are more likely to experience illness and dis-
ability than White Americans.131 “African Americans and other ethnic 
minorities have higher rates of childhood diseases such as measles and 
chicken-pox; chronic diseases such as diabetes, heart disease, and cancer; 
and communicable diseases such as HIV and tuberculosis.”132 In addition, 
as noted earlier, Black children are more likely than other children to 
have had an incarcerated parent.133 Controlling for other factors, research-
ers have found that children of incarcerated parents are more likely to 
have conditions like attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), de-
velopmental delays, learning disabilities, and behavioral problems.134
Race not only plays a role in causing disabling conditions, but it al-
so can influence whether a person with a disability will be diagnosed with 
and treated for their condition, and whether they will be correctly diag-
nosed and treated. Researchers have found that medical providers rou-
tinely underestimate the physical pain that Black patients experience, and 
thus underdiagnose and undertreat physical conditions.135 Black patients 
“are less likely than Whites to receive pain medication and, when they 
do, they receive less.”136 Similarly, Black patients receiving Medicare are 
128. Id.
129. Pokempner & Roberts, supra note 5, at 435.
130. Robert J. Sampson & Alix S. Winter, The Racial Ecology of Lead Poisoning: Toxic 
Inequality in Chicago Neighborhoods, 1995-2013, 13 DU BOIS REV. 261, 279 (2016). See 
also Terrence McCoy, Freddie Gray’s Life a Study on the Effects of Lead Paint on Poor Blacks,




131. Pokempner & Roberts, supra note 5, at 434.
132. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
133. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
134. MORSY & ROTHSTEIN, supra note 65, at 10-11.
135. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
136. Trawalter et al., supra note 70, at 1.
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less likely than White Medicare patients to receive all of the sixteen most 
common procedures, and “[t]he only four procedures blacks are more 
likely to receive, such as amputation, all reflect delayed diagnosis or 
treatment and poorer care.”137 One study suggests that this failure to treat 
physical pain among Black patients stems from providers viewing Black 
people as less privileged and as having faced more hardship than White 
people, in turn associating that hardship with “physical toughness.”138
Medical providers are not alone in underestimating Black Ameri-
cans’ pain and in perceiving Black people as having unusual physical 
strength. One study found that “[W]hite adults without medical training 
endorse at least some beliefs about biological differences between [B]lacks 
and [W]hites, many of which are false and fantastical in nature (e.g., 
[B]lack people’s blood coagulates more quickly than [W]hite people’s 
blood).”139 Another study found that National Football League personnel 
responsible for predicting whether injured players will be able to play the 
week after their injury thought that Black players were more likely to 
play in the next game than with White players with similar injuries.140 Fi-
nally, a police officer’s dismissal of Sandra Bland’s explanation that she 
had epilepsy after he pushed her to the ground during a traffic stop pre-
sents a real-world example of how Black Americans’ physical disabilities 
may be underestimated or disregarded.141
While Black patients are underdiagnosed and undertreated with re-
spect to physical conditions, they are overdiagnosed or misdiagnosed with 
certain mental conditions. For instance, Black patients are three to five 
times more likely than White patients to be diagnosed with schizophre-
nia, despite similar rates of prevalence.142 Researchers have further found 
that counselors disproportionately diagnose Black patients with psychotic 
disorders and with childhood disorders like conduct disorder, opposition-
137. Pokempner & Roberts, supra note 5, at 435.
138. Trawalter et al., supra note 70, at 5.
139. Hoffman et al., supra note 70, at 4298.
140. Trawalter et al., supra note 70, at 1-2.
141. See Margaret Talbot, Watching Sandra Bland, NEW YORKER (July 29, 2015), 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/watching-sandra-bland (describing 
the arrest of Sandra Bland, an African American woman, following a traffic stop and her 
death in a jail cell three days later).
142. Robert C. Schwartz & David M. Blankenship, Racial Disparities in Psychotic Disorder 
Diagnosis: A Review of Empirical Literature, 4 WORLD J. OF PSYCHIATRY 133, 135 (2014); 
see also Shankar Vedantam, Racial Disparities Found in Pinpointing Mental Illness, WASH.
POST (June 28, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/
06/27/AR2005062701496.html.
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al defiance disorder (ODD), and ADHD.143 These conditions “are often 
diagnosed and subjectively perceived as involving socially disruptive be-
haviors,” and many of the diagnostic criteria “involve acting out in ways 
that interfere with or disrupt others.”144 One contributing factor proffered 
for the racial disparity in the diagnosis of ODD, which is characterized by 
“a pattern of behavior that includes angry and irritable mood, argumenta-
tive and defiant behavior, and/or vindictiveness,” is that “White Ameri-
can clients presenting with the same disruptive behavioral symptoms as 
African American clients tend to be diagnosed with adjustment disor-
der,”145 which is “considered a residual category, often comprising the 
most mild of mental disorders.”146 By contrast, one review found a con-
sensus among researchers that mood disorders, which “usually require less 
invasive interventions and have better prognoses than do psychotic disor-
ders,” are “as underdiagnosed as schizophrenia is overdiagnosed” among 
Black patients.147 Together, this research indicates that Black bodies, 
Black behaviors, and Black words are routinely pathologized as signaling 
serious mental illness.
Importantly, the stigma attached to many disabilities further compli-
cates whether a person of color with a disability will receive help for their 
condition. Before she was shot and killed in her home by police who 
found her threatening, Deborah Danner wrote an essay articulating how 
“[s]tigma causes people to treat you differently.”148 Danner explains:
I’ve lost several jobs because of stigma—jobs I was succeeding 
at. I’ve gotten to the point where I now tell any employer 
who asks that I am “semi-retired” to avoid explaining, end-
lessly, that I have schizophrenia and that no, I won’t go postal 
and yes, I can handle more than normal stress(es) and no, I am 
not taking Thorazine, and no, I won’t be getting bouts of de-
143. Robert C. Schwartz & Kevin P. Feisthamel, Disproportionate Diagnosis of Mental 
Disorders Among African American Versus European American Clients: Implications for Counsel-
ing Theory, Research, and Practice, 87 J. OF COUNSELING & DEV. 295, 298 (2009).
144. Id.
145. Marc. A Grimmett et al., The Process and Implications of Diagnosing Oppositional Defi-
ant Disorder in African American Males, 6 THE PROF. COUNSELOR 147, 147-48 (2016). See 
also Kevin P. Feisthamel & Robert C. Schwartz, Differences in Mental Health Counselors’
Diagnoses Based on Client Race: An Investigation of Adjustment, Childhood, and Substance-
Related Disorders, 31 J. OF MENTAL HEALTH COUNSELING 47 (2009).
146. Feisthamel & Schwartz, supra note 145, at 51-52 (internal quotation marks and ci-
tations omitted).
147. Schwartz & Blankenship, supra note 142, at 296.
148. Deborah Danner, Living with Schizophrenia, N.Y. TIMES, at 5 (Oct. 19, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/10/19/nyregion/document-Living-With-
Schizophrenia-by-Deborah-Danner.html.
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pression that’ll make me miss work and that yes, I take medi-
cation daily to control it and that no I don’t act crazy and no, 
I don’t require special handling, thank you very much.149
While Danner does not expressly discuss her specific experience as a 
Black woman with schizophrenia in this essay, some Black Americans 
feel the exhausting stigma she describes due to the intersection of their 
race and their disability.150 As scholar Beth Ribet explains, “it is not un-
common for People of Color to ‘over-perform’ . . . in order to excel in 
hostile structures, and in the process negate or ‘disprove’ racial mytholo-
gies.”151 Likewise, people with disabilities may feel compelled to “prov[e] 
extraordinary capacity in various ways” in response to “a set of cultural 
messages about transcending limits and boundaries.”152 And “the two par-
allel dynamics fuse for People of Color with disabilities, creating an ex-
traordinary pressure to be better, stronger, smarter, more effective, flaw-
lessly capable, and apparently unharmed or immune to the strain of 
hyper-functioning . . . .”153 This pressure to defy expectations about both 
race and disability can contribute to a fear for people of color with disa-
bilities that seeking help will signal not only failure for themselves but for 
their communities.154 Accordingly, “[t]he request for disability accommo-
dation then, or even the recognition that one is struggling without it, can 
feel like a kind of surrender or defeat . . . .”155 “People of Color with dis-
abilities then must face the untenable choice: do without a resource that 
is needed for success and access or seek it out through channels that in 
themselves signal failure.”156 As the social model reveals, race can play a 
pivotal role not only in whether one will experience a disability and have 
that disability recognized by a medical professional, but in whether one 
will feel accepted in seeking and receiving help.
Viewed through the lens of the social model, the above discussion 
of how and why one may arrive at the intersection of race and disability 
informs an understanding of the experience of Black disabled bodies. This 
149. Id.
150. See Tara Bahrampour, Therapists say African Americans are Increasingly Seeking Help for 
Mental Illness, WASH. POST (July 9, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/
therapists-say-african-americans-are-increasingly-seeking-help-for-mental-illness/2013/
07/09/9b15cb4c-e400-11e2-a11e-c2ea876a8f30_story.html. See also Linda Villarosa, 
America’s Hidden H.I.V. Epidemic, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2017), https://mobile.
nytimes.com/2017/06/06/magazine/americas-hidden-hiv-epidemic.html.
151. Ribet, supra note 5, at 236.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 236-37.
155. Id. at 237.
156. Id.
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Section next highlights examples of the discrimination that Black disabled 
persons may experience due to the complex intersectional space they oc-
cupy.
The experience of Black deaf students seeking equal educational 
opportunity in the nineteenth century offers a prime example of the ways 
in which our legal and cultural institutions can flatten such experiences of 
intersectional discrimination, characterizing them singularly by race or 
disability. In the mid-1800s, Gallaudet University, the nation’s first insti-
tution of higher education dedicated to serving deaf students, educated 
both Black and White students.157 This was especially unusual in the pre-
Civil War era, when “Black people, both deaf and hearing, struggled to 
obtain a formal education,” and “it was a criminal offense in some states 
to educate enslaved people.”158
School superintendent Edward Miner Gallaudet continued to depart 
from the prevailing racially segregated approach to education when he 
accepted Black students into the Kendall School, an elementary school 
based on Gallaudet’s campus for District of Columbia students.159 He did 
so in response to “the intervention of wealthy [W]hite patrons,” and typ-
ically accepted “poor, Black deaf youth” such as “orphaned Black stu-
dents found abandoned in alleys, sponsored by church groups and other 
social agencies.”160 Because the inclusion of Black students at the Kendall 
School was charity-based rather than rights-based, however, Black and 
White students learned in the same classrooms but remained segregated in 
their sleeping and eating accommodations.161 And while Black students 
were initially accepted at the prompting of White philanthropists, by the 
end of the twentieth century, “[W]hite parents had begun to object 
strenuously to the presence of these students,” and White students began 
harassing their Black peers.162
Responding to this pressure, Gallaudet sought assistance from Con-
gress, which passed legislation in 1905 authorizing the transfer of the 
Black students to a segregated school for Black deaf and mute students in 
Maryland.163 In addition to being farther away from the students’ family 
and community supports in D.C., the Maryland school was rundown 
physically and students were not taught using the oral method of instruc-
157. Sandra Jowers-Barber, The Struggle to Educate Black Deaf School Children, in A FAIR 
CHANCE IN THE RACE OF LIFE: THE ROLE OF GALLAUDET UNIVERSITY IN DEAF 





162. Id. at 115.
163. Jowers-Barber, supra note 157, at 115.
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tion that was available in deaf schools which White children attended, 
then considered more advanced.164 As a result of the legislation, the Ken-
dall School would not see another Black student for nearly fifty years, 
when several Black parents successfully sued in 1952.165 When Black stu-
dents returned to the school later that year, they found themselves segre-
gated from their White classmates in all respects.166
This account of how Black students were treated at the Kendall 
School illustrates that people of color with disabilities can experience dis-
crimination in ways that are both similar to and different from the dis-
crimination experienced by others who share either of these traits. Cer-
tainly, Black students with and without disabilities experienced the sting 
of being segregated from their White peers based on the notion that their 
mere presence in a shared space would demean the educational experi-
ence for White children.167 Indeed, it was unusual at the time that the 
Kendall School’s Black students had ever shared a classroom with White 
students. Yet, eugenicists like Alexander Graham Bell advocated for the 
education of deaf students alongside hearing children based partly on the 
belief that segregated education for deaf children contributed to a ten-
dency of deaf people to marry one another, and threatened to create “a 
defective race of human beings [who] would be a great calamity to the 
world.”168 Paradoxically, the notion of Black inferiority was cited as a rea-
son for segregation, but the notion of deaf inferiority presented an argu-
ment for integration.
The Black deaf students at the Kendall School experienced some as-
pects of these forms of discrimination, but, by virtue of existing at the in-
tersection of race and disability, also experienced something different. 
Their deafness initially exempted them from a strict adherence to racial 
segregation in the classroom that they likely would have experienced 
otherwise. However, once the pity of White philanthropists eroded, their 
Blackness exempted them from the educational opportunities that the 
other deaf children enjoyed. Even within an institution where the differ-
ence of deafness was valorized, the difference of race remained vilified. 
This left Black deaf students in an unsteady position that only exists for 
164. Id. at 118.
165. Id. at 119-24.
166. See id. at 124-29.
167. LITWACK, supra note 31, at 489.
168. ALEXANDER GRAHAM BELL, UPON THE FORMATION OF A DEAF VARIETY OF THE 
HUMAN RACE 41, 46 (1883). Notably, Bell advocated only partial integration of deaf and 
hearing students and thought “the school that would most perfectly fulfill the condition 
required would contain only one deaf child.” See id. at 46-47. See also JACK R. GANNON,
DEAF HERITAGE: A NARRATIVE HISTORY OF DEAF AMERICA 75-77 (2011).
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those in the intersection—at first protected by their deafness, and then 
punished for their race.
Students of color with disabilities, particularly Black disabled stu-
dents, continue to face forms of discrimination that are at times in tension 
with one another. For instance, the U.S. Department of Education’s Of-
fice for Civil Rights has confirmed through its enforcement experience 
both the “over-identification of students of color as having disabilities” 
and the “under-identification of students of color who do have disabili-
ties.”169 Over-identification means “the inappropriate identification of a 
student who does not actually have a disability and who does not need 
services as a student with a disability.”170 By contrast, under-identification 
means “the failure to appropriately identify a student who has a disability 
and who does need services as a student with a disability.”171 This over-
identification suggests that students of color are too disabled, because aca-
demic performance or behaviors that may be a reflection of inadequate 
instruction or the highly subjective judgments of school staff are instead 
pathologized as signs of a disability.172 Yet, under-identification suggests 
that disabled students of color are simultaneously not disabled enough, be-
cause their need for modifications is underestimated or attributed to per-
sonal or cultural failings. As the National Council on Disability has ex-
plained, “[s]chool psychologists often find students of color ineligible for 
special education because their behavior is believed to be willful or pur-
poseful and not related to a disability.”173 Furthermore, these students 
may be misidentified due to implicit assumptions about their behaviors. 
The Department of Education has explained that “[B]lack students may 
be more likely to be classified as emotionally disturbed while [W]hite 
students with similar behavior may be more likely to be classified as hav-
ing ADHD.”174 While the identification of students of color with disabili-
ties is the subject of ongoing research and debate, these reports suggest 
that Black students are less likely to be found eligible for services and, 
when they are found eligible, it is in more stigmatized disability categories 
like “emotional disturbance.”
169. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Office for Civil Rights (OCR), Opinion Letter on Prevent-
ing Racial Discrimination in Special Education to States, Districts, and Schools 2 (Dec. 
12, 2016), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201612-
racedisc-special-education.pdf, at 2 (emphasis added) [hereinafter OCR Letter].
170. Id. at 2 n.5.
171. Id. (emphasis added).
172. See Losen & Welner, supra note 6, at 419-20, 440-41, 451.
173. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, BREAKING THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE 
FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES 48 (2015) [hereinafter NCD Report].
174. OCR Letter, supra note 169, at 16 n.46.
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With respect to school discipline, both students of color and stu-
dents with disabilities are disproportionately suspended and expelled, and 
this disparity is compounded for students of color with disabilities, who 
are disciplined more than any other group.175 Many students are disci-
plined for subjective behaviors, like being threatening or disruptive, and 
implicit biases may lead schools to consider the same behaviors more 
dangerous when presented by Black bodies.176 Paradoxically, these biases 
may lead schools to discipline Black students for behaviors that are mani-
festations of their disabilities while simultaneously denying that they are 
disabled and eligible for services, further reflecting the nuanced discrimi-
nation that occurs at the intersection of race and disability.
The story of Black and deaf Junius Wilson further illustrates the 
ways in which race and disability may amplify the other trait’s discrimina-
tory effects and additionally create a distinct form of discrimination. Ac-
cused of assault with intent to rape in 1925, Wilson was jailed, castrated, 
and held in a segregated mental hospital for sixty-eight years before his 
eventual release.177 Wilson was not, in fact, mentally ill, and he remained 
hospitalized for roughly twenty of those years even after the charges had 
been dropped, in large part because his family could no longer be 
found.178
As a child, Wilson attended the North Carolina School for the Col-
ored Blind and Deaf, where he was initiated into a unique Black deaf 
community.179 There, he learned “Raleigh signs,” a dialect of Black sign 
175. See NCD Report, supra note 173, at 11 (“Twenty-seven percent of African Ameri-
can boys with disabilities and 19 percent of African American girls with disabilities re-
ceived at least one out-of-school suspension in 2011-2012.”); Amanda L. Sullivan et al., 
Beyond Behavior: Multilevel Analysis of the Influence of Sociodemographics and School Characteris-
tics on Students’ Risk of Suspension, 42 SCH. PSYCHOL. REV. 99, 107 (2013) (explaining 
research showing that suspension is most prevalent among Black students and students 
with disabilities, and that the highest risk of suspension is for Black students with disabili-
ties).
176. See NCD Report, supra note 173, at 47-48 (citing studies showing that school ad-
ministrators “dole out harsher punishment to students of color than white students for the 
same or similar behavior.”); Russell J. Skiba et al., The Color of Discipline: Sources of Racial 
and Gender Disproportionality in School Punishment, 34 URB. REV. 317, 334-35 (2002) 
(“Significantly different patterns of referrals suggest that black students are more likely to 
be referred to the office for more subjective reasons.”).
177. See BURCH & JOYNER, supra note 48, at 1, 163. See also Nirmala Erevelles & An-
drea Minear, Unspeakable Offenses: Untangling Race and Disability in Discourses of Intersection-
ality, 4 J. OF LITERARY & CULTURAL DISABILITIES STUD. 127 (2010); Deaf Man, 96, Freed 
After 68 Years in Hospital, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/
02/06/us/deaf-man-96-freed-after-68-years-in-hospital.html [hereinafter  Deaf Man].
178. Deaf Man, supra note 177.
179. See BURCH & JOYNER, supra note 48, at 2.
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language180 that was virtually impossible for others outside the school to 
understand, even those fluent in the American Sign Language taught at 
White deaf schools.181 When he returned home, Wilson had difficulty 
communicating with his family and community, and they viewed him as 
“especially disruptive and uncontrollable.”182 His practice of “touching or 
holding people, stamping feet and waving arms (all common, acceptable, 
and meaningful interpersonal behaviors in the deaf world) were foreign 
and threatening to his hearing neighbors.”183 Wilson was likely consid-
ered even more threatening by White members of the community, as his 
education in a school for Black deaf children also meant he was unable to 
meaningfully communicate with White deaf individuals.184 Furthermore, 
Wilson’s method of communicating limited his ability to understand and 
navigate the Jim Crow rules that policed where Black bodies were per-
mitted to be and how they were permitted to move.185
Likely concerned that Wilson’s race and disability made him a 
threat, or at least a nuisance, when navigating the Jim Crow South, a 
family friend accused Wilson of assaulting and attempting to rape his wife 
in 1925.186 When Wilson was unable to understand a White jailer’s at-
tempts at sign language upon his arrest, the jailer assumed that his “deaf 
voice, inarticulate and perhaps quite loud, [constituted] howls of insani-
ty.”187 With Wilson unable to communicate effectively during a medical 
examination or at his “lunacy hearing,” the state concluded that he was 
“insane and violent” and ordered his institutionalization in the criminal 
ward of the North Carolina State Hospital for the Colored Insane.188 He 
was again viewed as threatening within the confines of this institution, 
and, in 1932, the hospital superintendent personally performed a surgical 
castration on Wilson.189 No longer considered threatening, Wilson was 
180. Deaf Man, supra note 177.
181. See BURCH & JOYNER, supra note 48, at 2-3, 7, 23-24.
182. Id. at 33.
183. Id.
184. See id. at 23-24; Ceil Lucas et al., The Intersection of African American English and 
Black American Sign Language, 17 INT’L J. OF BILINGUALISM 156, 158-59 (2015) (describing 
the author’s transition from a segregated school for Black deaf students to a racially inte-
grated school for the deaf as feeling “as if they were signing two different languages and in 
a foreign land”).
185. See BURCH & JOYNER, supra note 48, at 33-34.
186. See id. at 34-36.
187. Id. at 36.
188. Id. at 37-38.
189. Id. at 41, 47-50.
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removed from the criminal ward and sent to work on the hospital farm 
until his release sixty-two years later.190
Junius Wilson’s mode of interacting with the world was a product 
of his race and his disability conjointly, and because he could not be un-
derstood simply by race or disability, he was not understood at all. Ra-
ther, his race, disability, and gender worked in concert to render Wilson 
so dangerously different that segregation, institutionalization, and sterili-
zation were considered acceptable means of controlling his body. Wil-
son’s experience sharply exemplifies the distinct discrimination that Black 
disabled bodies may face when they are flattened and secreted away.
The above accounts are just a few examples of the ways in which 
people of color with disabilities are subject to complex and compound
forms of discrimination. In accordance with Justice Marshall’s warning in 
Cleburne that, “[p]rejudice, once let loose, is not easily cabined,”191 there 
are many permutations of how the world may discriminate against a per-
son who exists at the intersection of race and disability. The Black disa-
bled body may be feared like Eric Garner’s body because it is assumed to 
be impervious to pain and unduly strong;192 it may be deserted like Junius 
Wilson’s body because it is assumed to be inconsequential and feeble; it 
may be condemned like Kalief Browder’s body because it is assumed to 
be felonious and damaged;193 it may be discarded like Sandra Bland’s body 
190. Id. at 49. After the appointment of a guardian ad litem and a protracted legal dis-
pute, Wilson remained on the hospital grounds in a private cottage for the remainder of 
his life. Id. at 127–42.
191. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 464 (1985) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting).
192. See J. David Goodman & Michael Wilson, Officer Daniel Pantaleo Told Grand Jury 
He Meant No Harm to Eric Garner, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/nyregion/officer-told-grand-jury-he-meant-no-
harm-to-eric-garner.html?smid=pl-share (describing Officer Daniel Pantaleo’s grand jury 
testimony that he “became fearful as he found himself sandwiched between a much larger 
man and a storefront window” and that he heard Eric Garner saying “I can’t breathe, I 
can’t breathe,” but assumed that Garner’s ability to speak meant he could indeed breathe);
see also Nia-Malika Henderson, Peter King Blames Asthma and Obesity for Eric Garner’s
Death. That’s a Problem for the GOP., WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2014), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/12/04/peter-king-blames-asthma-
and-obesity-for-eric-garners-death-this-is-a-problem-for-the-
gop/?utm_term=.6c25eb704cf0 (citing Rep. Peter King’s comments that “[t]he police 
had no reason to know [Garner] was in serious condition . . . . You had a 350-pound 
person who was resisting arrest”).
193. See Jennifer Gonnerman, Before the Law, NEW YORKER (Oct. 6, 2014), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/06/before-the-law (detailing Browder’s
deteriorating mental health and multiple suicide attempts during his roughly seventeen 
months in solitary confinement at Rikers Island jail).
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because it is assumed to be resistant and erratic;194 it may be derided like 
the body of John R.K. Howard’s victim because it is assumed to be un-
trustworthy and inept;195 it may be shattered like the bodies of Eleanor 
Bumpurs and Deborah Danner because it is assumed to be stubborn and 
volatile;196 and it may be silenced like Abrehem Zemedagegehu’s body 
because it is assumed to be alien and docile.197 Or it may be erased entire-
ly. In an effort to avoid that erasure, Part Three of this Article analyzes 
how a plaintiff experiencing discrimination at this intersection may assert 
their legal claims.
III.  Situating an Intersectional Discrimination Claim Based on 
Race and Disability in Employment Discrimination Law
As the previous sections of this Article demonstrate, people of color 
with disabilities face myriad and complex forms of intersectional discrim-
ination that are distinct from the discrimination experienced by either 
people of color or people with disabilities generally. This acknowledge-
ment is a necessary foundation for recognizing that those who experience 
194. See DAVID M. PERRY & LAWRENCE CARTER-LONG, RUDERMAN FAMILY 
FOUND., THE RUDERMAN WHITE PAPER ON MEDIA COVERAGE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 
USE OF FORCE AND DISABILITY: A MEDIA STUDY (2013-2015) AND OVERVIEW 17-18 
(2016) (describing an officer’s response to Bland after she complained of being slammed 
to the ground during arrest and informed officers of her epilepsy: “You should have 
thought about it before you started resisting.”); Talbot, supra note 141.
195. See Avi Selk, White Classmate Avoids Jail in Coat-Hanger Assault of Disabled Black 
Teenager, WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
morning-mix/wp/2017/02/26/slap-on-the-wrist-white-classmate-avoids-jail-in-coat-
hanger-assault-of-disabled-black-teen/?utm_term=.86dc21d76af4 (describing a White 
high school student’s legal defense after facing charges for kicking a wire hanger into the 
rectum of a Black classmate with disabilities, namely, that “the disabled teenager was a 
liar, coached by his parents”).
196. See Alan Feuer, Fatal Police Shooting in Bronx Echoes One from 32 Years Ago, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 19, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/20/nyregion/fatal-police-
shooting-in-bronx-echoes-one-from-32-years-ago.html?_r=0 (recounting the stories of 
Danner and Bumpurs, both mentally ill, older Black women fatally shot by the police in 
their homes because they were perceived to be threats); Eli Rosenberg & Ashley Southall, 
In Quick Response, de Blasio Calls Fatal Shooting of Mentally Ill Woman ‘Unacceptable’, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 19, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/20/nyregion/nypd-
sergeant-fatal-shooting-bronx-woman.html.
197. See Matt Zapotosky, A Deaf Man’s Jail Ordeal in Arlington: ‘I felt stuck. I was stuck.’,
WASH. POST (Sept. 30, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/
mistreatment-of-the-deaf-in-prison-in-2015/2015/09/30/0c1244e8-5e1a-11e5-9757-
e49273f05f65_story.html?utm_term=.01da7540d6db (describing a deaf Ethiopian immi-
grant’s detention for six weeks in the Arlington County jail for later withdrawn theft alle-
gations, during which he was unable to effectively communicate with others about his 
basic needs or his arrest); VALLAS, supra note 103, at 6.
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discrimination based on the intersection of their race and disability de-
serve redress that is independent of the remedies proffered in response to 
racial discrimination or disability discrimination. Furthermore, an under-
standing of the various ways in which discrimination based on the inter-
section of race and disability may manifest provides critical context for 
developing legal theories and strategies to adequately remedy that dis-
crimination. Given this context, the following sections of this Article fo-
cus on employment discrimination law, setting forth how plaintiffs can 
articulate and prove workplace intersectional discrimination claims based 
on race and disability, offering examples of such claims, and discussing 
the available remedies.
Several existing civil rights statutes have the potential to advance the 
law on intersectional discrimination. For example, the Fair Housing Act 
and the Affordable Care Act each prohibit discrimination because of race, 
disability, and other protected traits, presenting the opportunity for plain-
tiffs to use either of these statutes to assert an intersectional discrimination 
claim.198 In other cases, plaintiffs may need to argue the elements of mul-
tiple statutes in order to assert an intersectional discrimination claim. For 
instance, any of the individuals noted at the conclusion of Part Two who
were harmed during their interactions with law enforcement or correc-
tions officials might use Title VI of the Civil Rights Act199—which pro-
hibits discrimination because of race, color, or national origin—and Title 
II of the ADA200—which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disabil-
ity—together to assert an intersectional claim against a state or local gov-
ernment actor.
Yet the case law analyzing intersectional discrimination claims has 
thus far centered on employment discrimination under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII). This may be because Jefferies v. Har-
ris County Community Action Association, most often cited as the first case 
to expressly recognize a claim of intersectional discrimination, was a Title 
VII case in which a Black woman alleged employment discrimination 
based on race, sex, and a combination of her race and sex.201 Indeed, the 
breadth of protected traits covered by Title VII—race, color, religion, 
sex, and national origin—invites a wide variety of intersectional discrimi-
nation claims under the statute.202 For example, Title VII creates room for 
both a Black male who alleges discrimination on the basis of race and sex 
198. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2012).
199. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012).
200. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012). See also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2012) (defining disability 
as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activi-
ties”).
201. Jefferies v. Harris Cty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032 (5th Cir. 1980).
202. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).
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and a Syrian Muslim who alleges discrimination on the basis of national 
origin and religion to obtain relief.
Furthermore, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) offers plaintiffs guidance by explicitly confirming that Title VII 
authorizes claims of employment discrimination “not just because of one 
protected trait (e.g., race), but also because of the intersection of two or 
more protected bases (e.g., race and sex).”203 The guidance additionally 
explains that Title VII “prohibits individuals from being subjected to dis-
crimination because of the intersection of their race and a trait covered 
by another EEO statute—e.g., race and disability, or race and age.”204
However, this guidance stops short of explaining exactly how plaintiffs 
can allege and prove these intersectional discrimination claims. While few 
plaintiffs explicitly assert intersectional discrimination claims, race and dis-
ability are separately the two most common protected traits cited in 
charges of discrimination filed with the EEOC.205 For these reasons, em-
ployment discrimination is a useful place to focus this analysis of intersec-
tional discrimination claims based on race and disability.
Section A below analyzes the applicable causation standard for em-
ployment discrimination claims based on the intersection of race and dis-
ability. Section B examines the evidence that plaintiffs will need to prove
such claims, and Section C offers examples of claims they may assert. 
Lastly, Section D discusses the remedies available and their potential to 
offer plaintiffs thicker protection from the multidimensional forms of dis-
crimination they face.
A.  What Causation Standard Applies to Intersectional Discrimination Claims 
Based on Race and Disability?
The most critical, and perhaps most difficult, question to answer 
with regard to intersectional discrimination claims is the causation stand-
ard to which plaintiffs will be held. In other words, what role must the 
plaintiff’s combination of protected traits play in the employer’s conduct 
in order to prove that discrimination, rather than some legitimate reason, 
explains their harms? Courts analyzing the appropriate standard for em-
ployment discrimination claims under Title VII and the ADA primarily 
203. EEOC, EEOC COMPL. MAN., DIRECTIVES TRANSMITTAL NO. 915.003, at 15-8
(2006), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/race-color.pdf [hereinafter EEOC Compli-
ance Manual].
204. Id. at 15-9.
205. Charge Statistics (Charges filed with EEOC) FY 1997 Through FY 2017, EEOC, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited June 21, 
2018). In FY 2017, 33.9 percent of charges included a racial discrimination claim and 
31.9 percent included a disability discrimination claim. Id.
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consider two standards—the “motivating factor” standard and the “but-
for” standard.206 Under the but-for standard, a plaintiff must show that she 
would not have been harmed were it not for the protected trait; whereas 
under the motivating factor standard, the plaintiff need only show that 
the protected trait was one among any number of factors that explain the 
harm.207 A successful plaintiff asserting an intersectional discrimination 
claim based on race and disability must determine which of these stand-
ards will apply to her claim, and the answer begins with an examination 
of the standards that separately apply to race and disability discrimination 
claims.
The case law on the applicable standard for antidiscrimination stat-
utes like Title VII and the ADA has evolved considerably over time, as 
courts have considered not only which standard applies to each statute 
but also whether different types of claims within a statute should be sub-
ject to the same standard.208 These cases focus closely on the specific 
statutory language prohibiting discrimination. Title VII prohibits em-
ployment discrimination against any individual “because of such individ-
ual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,”209 whereas Title I of 
the ADA prohibits employment discrimination “on the basis of disabil-
ity.”210 A previous version of the ADA prohibited employment discrimi-
nation “because of the disability” of the individual.211 For discrimination 
claims, the focus of this Article, both the Supreme Court and Congress 
have clarified that the motivating factor standard applies to Title VII cas-
es. The standard under the ADA, by contrast, remains an unsettled ques-
tion, but the trend of recent cases suggests that some courts may apply 
the stricter but-for standard to ADA claims. Facing the potential of two 
206. See infra Section III.A.1. A third standard, requiring that the protected trait be the 
sole cause of the plaintiff’s harm, applies to employment discrimination under the Reha-
bilitation Act, but the Supreme Court has rejected this standard for Title VII claims, and 
all circuit courts now reject this standard for ADA claims as well, despite the ADA’s simi-
larities to the Rehabilitation Act. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 
n.7 (1989); Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 315-17 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(collecting cases).
207. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240, 250.
208. See infra Section III.A.1. Both Title VII and the ADA prohibit not only discrimina-
tion based on the individual’s protected status (status-based discrimination), but also retali-
ation against an individual because they complained of unlawful discrimination or partici-
pated in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112, 12203 (2008); 
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3 (2009).
209. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2009).
210. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2009).
211. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 
(1990).
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different standards, intersectional plaintiffs are left to wonder which will 
apply to their claim.
To answer this question, Subsection One reviews the relevant case 
law, and Subsection Two argues that the motivating factor standard is the 
better-reasoned approach for discrimination cases, especially for claims 
under the current version of the ADA. Subsection Three considers which 
standard should apply specifically in intersectional discrimination cases, 
drawing on Crenshaw’s analysis of the paradoxical outcomes that will re-
sult from applying the but-for standard. As the intersectionality frame-
work reveals, the but-for standard threatens to exclude from all relief 
plaintiffs who have faced the most complex forms of discrimination and 
are most in need of redress, in favor of those who can easily identify a 
singular source of their harm. Nonetheless, recognizing that some courts 
may apply the but-for standard to intersectional claims under Title VII 
and the ADA given the lack of guidance, Subsection Three also offers 
thoughts as to how plaintiffs asserting these claims can navigate the more 
difficult standard.
1.  A Review of Case Law Analyzing Applicable Causation Standards
Recent Supreme Court decisions have created considerable uncer-
tainty for litigants and lower courts, but the trend of these cases suggests 
that courts will apply the motivating factor standard to Title VII discrim-
ination claims and the but-for standard to ADA discrimination claims. 
While the Supreme Court has not expressly addressed the applicable 
standard in ADA cases, its analysis of the standard for another statute, the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), caused some courts to 
cautiously apply the but-for standard to ADA claims. This development 
in the case law thus indicates that plaintiffs alleging discrimination based 
on the intersection of race and disability could be subject to either stand-
ard.
The Supreme Court first addressed the applicable causation standard 
for Title VII claims in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, in which a female sen-
ior manager at an accounting firm alleged gender discrimination when 
she did not make partner.212 A plurality of the Court agreed that the 
plaintiff could prevail under a “mixed motive” theory if she showed that 
her gender was a “motivating” factor in the employer’s decision,213 mean-
ing that “if we asked the employer at the moment of the decision what 
its reasons were and if we received a truthful response, one of those rea-
212. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 231-32 (1989).
213. Id. at 258.
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sons would be that the applicant or employee was a woman.”214 If she did 
so, the employer could “avoid a finding of liability only by proving that 
it would have made the same decision even if it had not allowed gender 
to play such a role.”215
To reach this holding, the Court focused on Title VII’s statutory 
language prohibiting discrimination “because of such individual’s . . .
sex.”216 The Court rejected the argument that the words “because of” are 
“colloquial shorthand for ‘but-for causation,’ ” and explained that, “since 
we know that the words ‘because of’ do not mean ‘solely because of,’ we 
also know that Title VII meant to condemn even those decisions based 
on a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate considerations.”217 According-
ly, when “an employer considers both gender and legitimate factors at 
the time of making a decision, that decision was ‘because of’ sex and the 
other, legitimate considerations—even if we may say later, in the context 
of litigation, that the decision would have been the same if gender had 
not been taken into account.”218 Following Price Waterhouse, Congress 
amended Title VII to provide that a plaintiff establishes an unlawful em-
ployment practice when they demonstrate that “race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, 
even though other factors also motivated the practice.”219 While Price Wa-
terhouse only concerned Title VII’s causation standard, most circuit courts 
considering ADA claims thereafter also applied the motivating factor 
standard.220
214. Id. at 250.
215. Id. at 244-45; see id. at 258.
216. Id. at 240 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1), (2) (1991)).
217. Id. at 240-41.
218. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241 (1989).
219. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1991). With respect to the employer’s burden, however, 
Congress rejected Price Waterhouse’s holding that a defendant who proves they would have 
made the decision otherwise can defeat liability entirely; instead, Title VII provides that 
courts may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees and costs in such 
cases. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (1991).
220. See, e.g., Pinkerton v. Spellings, 529 F.3d 513, 519 (5th Cir. 2008); Head v. Glaci-
er Nw. Inc., 413 F.3d 1053, 1063-65 (9th Cir. 2005); Parker v. Columbia Pictures In-
dus., 204 F.3d 326, 336-37 (2d Cir. 2000); Baird ex rel. Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 
470 (4th Cir. 1999); Foster v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 168 F.3d 1029, 1033 (7th Cir. 
1999); Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1996); Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transp., 
Inc., 60 F.3d 1300, 1301 (8th Cir. 1995). But see Fitzgerald v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 403 
F.3d 1134, 1144 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that, under the ADA, a plaintiff must show 
that they were denied benefits “solely by reason of disability”); Hedrick v. W. Reserve 
Care Sys., 355 F.3d 444, 454 (6th Cir. 2004) (applying the sole causation standard to 
ADA claims relying on prior precedent). At least one commentator has identified ambigu-
ity in whether the Eleventh Circuit adopted the motivating factor or but-for causation 
standard in McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068, 1077 (11th Cir. 1996), since 
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The Supreme Court’s analysis of the causation standard under the 
ADEA in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. complicated this case law.221
In Gross, the Supreme Court again interpreted the statutory meaning of 
“because of,” as the ADEA “makes it unlawful for an employer to take 
adverse action against an employee ‘because of such individual’s age.’ ”222
In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that a plaintiff alleging disparate treat-
ment223 under the ADEA must prove that age was the but-for cause of 
the employer’s decision, and that “[t]he burden of persuasion does not 
shift to the employer to show that it would have taken the action regard-
less of age.”224 Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas focused on the 
fact that Congress amended Title VII after Price Waterhouse to codify the 
motivating factor standard but did not make similar changes to the 
ADEA.225 The Court therefore found Price Waterhouse inapplicable—
Justice Thomas even questioned whether the decision was “doctrinally 
sound”226—and turned to the plain language of the ADEA.227 Relying on 
dictionary definitions of the phrase “because of” to mean “by reason of”
and “on account of,” the Court concluded that “the ordinary meaning of 
the ADEA’s requirement that an employer took adverse action ‘because 
of’ age is that age was the ‘reason’ the employer decided to act.”228 Ac-
cording to the Gross majority, “[t]o establish a disparate-treatment claim 
under the plain language of the ADEA, therefore, a plaintiff must prove 
that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s adverse decision.”229
However, the language of the ADEA and the Supreme Court’s pri-
or precedent both offer compelling reasons to reject the but-for standard 
set forth in Gross. As Justice Breyer and Justice Stevens point out in their 
dissenting opinions, “[t]he words ‘because of’ do not inherently require a 
the decision states that “[i]n everyday usage, ‘because of’ conveys the idea of a factor that 
made a difference in the outcome,” but expressly states that “[t]he ADA imposes a ‘but-
for’ liability standard.” See Lisa Schlesinger, The Social Model’s Case for Inclusion: “Motivat-
ing Factor” and “But For” Standards of Proof Under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the 
Impact of the Social Model of Disability on Employees with Disabilities, 35 CARDOZO L. REV.
2115, 2126-27 (2014).
221. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs. Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009).
222. Id. at 170 (citing the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 
623(a) (2006)).
223. See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52 (2003) (explaining that disparate 
treatment occurs when “[t]he employer simply treats some people less favorably than oth-
ers because of their race, color, religion, sex, or [other protected characteristic]”) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted) (second alteration in original).
224. Gross, 557 U.S. at 180.
225. Id. at 174.
226. Id. at 179.
227. Id. at 175.
228. Id. at 176 (internal citations omitted).
229. Id.
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showing of ‘but-for’ causation,”230 and “the most natural reading of the 
text proscribes adverse employment actions motivated in whole or in part 
by the age of the employee.”231 Furthermore, the Court’s longstanding 
precedent holds that its “interpretations of Title VII’s language apply with 
equal force in the context of age discrimination, for the substantive pro-
visions of the ADEA were derived . . . from Title VII.”232
Justice Breyer offers an additional reason to reject the but-for stand-
ard, arguing that it is especially ill-suited for discrimination cases.233 Justice 
Breyer explains that, for a typical tort plaintiff, “reasonably objective sci-
entific or commonsense theories of physical causation make the concept 
of ‘but-for’ causation comparatively easy to understand and relatively easy 
to apply.”234 However, in a discrimination case, we often must “ascribe 
motives, after an event, to an individual in light of the individual’s 
thoughts and other circumstances present at the time of decision.”235 The 
answer to “what would have happened if the employer’s thoughts and 
other circumstances had been different . . . will often be far from obvi-
ous, and, since the employee likely knows less than does the employer 
about what the employer was thinking at the time, the employer will of-
ten be in a stronger position than the employee to provide the answer.”236
Thus, “[a]ll that a plaintiff can know for certain in such a context is that 
the forbidden motive did play a role in the employer’s decision. And the 
fact that a jury has found that age did play a role in the decision justifies 
the use of the word ‘because,’ i.e., the employer dismissed the employee 
because of his age (and other things).”237
This line of cases interpreting Title VII and the ADEA has muddied 
the waters for courts considering the appropriate standard in ADA dis-
crimination cases.238 Following Gross, some circuit courts have declined 
230. Gross, 557 U.S. at 190 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
231. Id. at 182 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 183 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
233. See id. at 190-91 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
234. Id. at 190.
235. Id. at 190-91.
236. Gross, 557 U.S. at 191.
237. Id.
238. These cases have also impacted the interpretation of ADA retaliation claims. In a 
subsequent 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs alleging retaliation under 
Title VII must satisfy the but-for standard. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 
570 U.S. 338, 352 (2013). This decision relied heavily on the language in Title VII pro-
hibiting retaliation against an employee “because he has opposed any practice” made un-
lawful under Title VII or “because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated 
in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing” under Title VII, comparing it 
to the language in Gross. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a) (2012)). Although Nassar 
concerned only Title VII’s retaliation provision, most circuit courts to decide the question 
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to extend Title VII’s motivating factor standard to ADA discrimination 
cases, instead applying the but-for standard.239 Other circuits have ex-
pressed doubt that the motivating factor standard applies but have de-
clined to answer the question, because the parties did not properly raise 
the issue or because the plaintiff’s claim would fail under both stand-
ards.240 Others have yet to take a clear position since Gross, but continue 
to apply the motivating factor standard in ADA cases relying on prior 
precedent.241 The state of the case law is thus far from clear, but the trend 
of these cases suggests that some courts may be inclined to cautiously ap-
ply the but-for standard to ADA claims absent guidance otherwise.
2.  Arguing Against the But-for Standard in 
Disability Discrimination Cases
In addition to the aforementioned reasons to reject the but-for 
standard in discrimination cases, there is further reason to reject this 
standard as it would apply specifically to disability claims. The Gross deci-
sion emphasizes that Congress codified the motivating factor standard 
under Title VII following Price Waterhouse but did not similarly codify 
this standard when it amended the ADEA.242 However, although Con-
since have also applied the but-for standard to the ADA’s retaliation provision. See, e.g.,
Lincoln v. BNSF Railway Co., No. 17-1085, 2018 WL 3945875, at * 28 (10th Cir. Aug. 
17, 2018); Oehmke v. Medtronic, Inc., 844 F.3d 748, 758 (8th Cir. 2016); Hillmann v. 
City of Chicago, 834 F.3d 787, 795 (7th Cir. 2016); T.B. v. San Diego Unified Sch. 
Dist., 806 F.3d 451, 473 (9th Cir. 2015); EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d 753, 767, 
770 (6th Cir. 2015); Palmer v. McDonald, 624 F. App’x 699, 702-03 (11th Cir. 2015);
Staley v. Gruenberg, 575 F. App’x 153, 155 (4th Cir. 2014); Feist v. La. Dep’t of Justice, 
Office of the Att’y Gen., 730 F.3d 450, 454 (5th Cir. 2013). See also Palmquist v. 
Shinseki, 689 F.3d 66, 77 (1st Cir. 2012) (holding that retaliation claims under the Reha-
bilitation Act require but-for causation because “the ADA’s but-for causation standard 
controls whether a defendant is liable for retaliation”). But see Proudfoot v. Arnold Logis-
tics, LLC, 629 F. App’x 303, 308 n.5 (3d Cir. 2015) (declining to decide if the but-for 
standard applies to ADA retaliation claims because the plaintiff’s claim would fail regard-
less); Flieger v. Eastern Suffolk BOCES, 693 F. App’x 14, 19 (2d Cir. 2017) (same).
239. See, e.g., Gentry v. E.W. Partners Club Mgmt. Co., 816 F.3d 228, 234 (4th Cir. 
2016); Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 321 (6th Cir. 2012); Ser-
watka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 962 (7th Cir. 2010).
240. See, e.g., Oehmke v. Medtronic, Inc., 844 F.3d 748, 756-57 n.6 (8th Cir. 2016); 
Doe v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Payne Cty., Okla., 613 F. App’x 743, 747 n.3 (10th Cir. 
2015). See also Bukiri v. Lynch, 648 F. App’x 729, 731 n.1 (9th Cir. 2016) (associational 
discrimination claim).
241. See, e.g., Phillips v. Victor Cmty. Support Servs., Inc., 692 F. App’x 920, 921 (9th 
Cir. 2017); Dillard v. City of Austin, 837 F.3d 557, 561 (5th Cir. 2016); Hoffman v. Bay-
lor Health Care Sys., 597 F. App’x 231, 235 n.12 (5th Cir. 2015); EEOC v. LHC Group, 
Inc., 773 F.3d 688, 702 (5th Cir. 2014).
242. Gross, 557 U.S. at 174 (majority opinion).
56 Michigan Journal of Race & Law [VOL. 24:15
gress did not explicitly address the causation standard when it amended 
the ADA in 2008, it did amend the language prohibiting disability dis-
crimination in order to “mirror the structure of nondiscrimination pro-
tection in Title VII.”243 Prior to the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 
(ADAAA), the ADA’s statutory language included a general rule prohib-
iting discrimination against a qualified individual with a disability “be-
cause of the disability of such individual.”244 The ADAAA amended this 
language to prohibit discrimination “on the basis of disability.”245 A Re-
port from the House Committee on the Judiciary explains why Congress 
“[a]lign[ed] the construction of the Americans with Disabilities Act with 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964”:246
This more direct language, structured like Title VII, ensures 
that the emphasis in questions of disability discrimination is 
properly on the critical inquiry of whether a qualified person 
has been discriminated against on the basis of disability, and 
not unduly focused on the preliminary question of whether a 
particular person is even a “person with a disability” with any 
protections under the Act at all.247
In other words, finding that the “because of” language unduly distracted 
courts from the central inquiry of whether discrimination based on disa-
bility has occurred, Congress revised the statutory language in order to 
obtain similar protections for ADA plaintiffs as for Title VII plaintiffs.  
Thus, irrespective of Gross’s implications for cases interpreting the ADA’s 
“because of” language, the decision arguably does not apply to cases de-
cided under the ADAAA.248
Notwithstanding this legislative intent to align the ways in which 
ADA and Title VII cases are construed, some may argue that the stricter 
but-for standard is appropriate for disability cases on the ground that, un-
like one’s race, an individual’s disability may interfere with their ability to 
work such that an employer may justifiably treat them differently. As an 
initial matter, the same argument about one’s suitability for work has of-
243. H.R. REP. No. 110-730(I), at *16 (2008).
244. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327, 
331-32 (1990).
245. See 42 § U.S.C. 12112 (2009) (emphasis added).
246. H.R. REP. No. 110-730(I) at *6 (2008).
247. Id. at *16.
248. See Mark R. Deethardt, Life After Gross: Creating a New Center for Disparate Treat-
ment Proof Structures, 72 LA. L. REV. 178, 212 (2011); Corey Stein, Mixed-Motive Jury In-
structions under the ADA and ADAAA: Are they Still Applicable in the Wake of Gross v. FBL 
Financial Services, Inc. and University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar?,
44 SETON HALL L. REV. 1223, 1250-53 (2014).
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ten been made with respect to sex,249 but both the Supreme Court and 
Congress have clarified that the motivating factor standard properly ap-
plies to workplace discrimination occurring because of sex. More im-
portantly, this argument confuses the question of causation with that of 
liability. In enacting the ADA, Congress accounted for the impact that 
one’s disability might have on their ability to work by limiting the law’s 
protection to those who, with or without reasonable accommodations, 
are qualified to perform “the essential functions of the employment,” and 
by excusing employers from making accommodations that would impose 
an “undue hardship” on their operations.250 But to say that the employer 
will not be liable in certain circumstances for treating an employee differ-
ently on the basis of their disability is no answer to the question of 
whether that disability has caused the employer’s action or inaction. This 
argument for the but-for standard is therefore unavailing, and there is no 
apparent reason why the standard for proving that disability has caused a 
person’s harms should be any different than the standard for proving that 
race or another protected trait has caused harm.
3.  Identifying the Applicable Causation Standard for Intersectional 
Discrimination Claims Based on Race and Disability
Depending on the jurisdiction and how they frame their claims, 
plaintiffs alleging intersectional discrimination based on race and disability 
may be subject to either the motivating factor standard that applies to 
race discrimination claims or to the but-for standard that some courts ap-
ply to disability discrimination claims. Crafting a coherent theory for 
these intersectional claims will thus be challenging in the absence of guid-
ance as to which standard applies. However, the Supreme Court’s “plus 
discrimination” cases and EEOC guidance together suggest that plaintiffs 
may be able to assert such an intersectional claim entirely under Title VII 
and its motivating factor standard if they choose. If plaintiffs do file under 
both Title VII and the ADA, Crenshaw’s intersectionality framework 
underscores the importance of applying the motivating factor standard, as 
249. The prohibition of discrimination because of sex was added to Title VII by a Vir-
ginia legislator late in the debate process in what some have characterized as “a last-ditch, 
if ultimately unsuccessful, attempt to derail a piece of legislation to which he was fiercely 
opposed.” Cary Franklin, Inventing the “Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1318 (2012). Some legislators opposed adding sex to the law based 
on the view that “workplace law and policy should acknowledge women’s special role in 
the family.” Id. at 1320. Further, when Title VII was amended in 1972, Congress ex-
plained that “discrimination against women continues to be widespread, and is regarded by 
many as either morally or physiologically justifiable.” Id. at 1346 (emphasis added) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted).
250. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2008); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), (b)(5)(A) (2008).
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the but-for standard risks unduly steepening the hill that plaintiffs must 
climb in order to prove their claims, inconsistent with the purposes of 
both Title VII and the ADA.
First, legal precedent in “sex plus” and “race plus” discrimination 
cases suggests that many plaintiffs may be able to assert intersectional dis-
crimination claims entirely under Title VII, even where some of the pro-
tected traits in the intersection are protected by different civil rights stat-
utes.251 In a case decided just a few years after Title VII was first enacted, 
the Supreme Court recognized the “sex plus” theory of discrimination, 
by which a plaintiff alleges that they were discriminated against on the 
basis of sex under Title VII plus another trait, such as having children or 
being married.252 The Supreme Court thus recognized that discrimination 
on the basis of sex plus an unrelated factor still constitutes sex discrimina-
tion under Title VII. Otherwise, as the Fifth Circuit later noted in Jeffer-
ies, if employers are “[f]ree to add non-sex factors, the rankest sort of dis-
crimination against women can be worked by employers,” for instance, if 
an employer treats employees differently based on physical characteris-
tics.253 Various lower courts have since similarly recognized this theory in 
Title VII “race plus” cases.254
When embracing the concept of intersectional discrimination, the 
court in Jefferies found the sex-plus cases instructive because they stood
for the proposition that “[t]he effect of the statute is not to be diluted be-
cause discrimination adversely affects only a portion of the protected 
class.”255 That is, the fact that an employer decided to treat married wom-
en unfavorably in particular but not all women does not mean that the 
employer did not discriminate based on sex. Specifically considering 
claims of Black women based on sex plus race, the court found that re-
jecting the plus discrimination theory in that context would create a 
“particularly illogical result, since the ‘plus’ factors . . . are ostensibly 
‘neutral’ factors, while race itself is prohibited as a criterion for employ-
ment.”256 In other words, it defies logic and the purpose of the law if dis-
crimination based on sex plus marital status, a status that is not itself a 
251. See infra notes 252-255.
252. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 543-44 (1971) (per curiam).
253. Jefferies v. Harris Cty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1033 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(citing Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 416 F.2d 1257, 1260 (5th Cir. 1969) (Brown, J., 
dissenting), vacated, 400 U.S. 542 (1971)).
254. See e.g., Craig v. Yale Univ. Sch. of Med., 838 F. Supp. 2d 4, 9 (D. Conn. 2011) 
(recognizing a “race plus” intersectional claim of discrimination against black males); 
Kimble v. Wisc. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 690 F. Supp. 2d 765, 769-71 (E.D. Wis. 
2010) (same); Jeffers v. Thompson, 264 F. Supp. 2d 314, 326-27 (D. Md. 2003) (recog-
nizing a claim of “race-and-gender” bias by an African-American female plaintiff).
255. Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1034 (internal citations omitted).
256. Id.
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protected trait, is prohibited but discrimination based on sex plus race, a 
trait that is protected by Title VII, is permissible. As Jefferies and other 
courts have held, Title VII allows for both types of “plus” discrimination 
claims.
Likewise, there is no clear reason why a “race plus disability” claim 
would not similarly constitute a form of racial discrimination under Title 
VII. Otherwise, a plaintiff who wished to show that their race plus their 
parental status caused discriminatory harm could do so under the moti-
vating factor standard, but a plaintiff who wished to show that their race 
plus their disability caused discrimination may have to satisfy the but-for 
standard. This result begs the question, what type of “protection” does 
the trait of disability receive if plaintiffs may be required to offer more 
stringent proof for this protected trait than for a purportedly neutral trait.
Secondly, the EEOC’s guidance also suggests that plaintiffs may be 
able to assert intersectional discrimination claims based on race and disa-
bility entirely under Title VII. As the EEOC’s Compliance Manual ex-
plains, an employer violates Title VII when they discriminate against an 
employee “because of the intersection of their race and a trait covered by 
another EEO statute—e.g., race and disability . . . .”257 In other words, 
discrimination based on race and disability together is a form of discrimi-
nation based on race prohibited by Title VII. Accordingly, courts would 
be well within their reason to accept intersectional discrimination claims 
based on race and disability asserted entirely under Title VII.
However, for those plaintiffs who do allege intersectional discrimi-
nation under both Title VII and the ADA, some courts may be persuaded 
to apply the but-for causation standard based on the rationale that, where 
two different standards apply, courts should apply the strictest standard to 
the entire intersectional claim. Otherwise, a plaintiff could prove discrim-
ination based on the intersection of race and disability under the motivat-
ing factor standard more easily than if they had solely alleged discrimina-
tion based on disability and been subject to the but-for standard. While 
this argument has some intuitive appeal, it overlooks the fact that the in-
tersectional discrimination claim will fail if race has not actually motivat-
ed the employer’s actions in some way. Plaintiffs will thus not succeed in 
any attempt to somehow “game the system” by adding unfounded allega-
tions of racial discrimination to what would otherwise solely be a claim 
under the ADA in an effort to lower their causation standard. Further-
more, the 2008 changes to the ADA reveal that Congress meant to en-
sure that courts construed the ADA in line with Title VII,258 and applying 
257. EEOC Compliance Manual, supra note 203, at 15-9.
258. See supra notes 243-248.
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the but-for standard to an intersectional claim asserted under both statutes 
would defeat that legislative purpose.
Kimberelé Crenshaw’s intersectionality analysis offers further reason 
to reject the but-for standard in the context of intersectional discrimina-
tion claims by highlighting how this approach impacts those meant to 
benefit from antidiscrimination laws. As Crenshaw cautions, using “a sin-
gular ‘but for’ analysis to ascertain the effects of race or sex” limits anti-
discrimination law such that “sex and race discrimination have come to 
be defined in terms of the experiences of those who are privileged but for 
their racial or sexual characteristics.”259 Crenshaw offers a useful analogy 
to illustrate the consequences of this narrowly tailored understanding of 
discrimination:
Imagine a basement which contains all people who are disad-
vantaged on the basis of race, sex, class, sexual preference, age 
and/or physical ability. These people are stacked—feet stand-
ing on shoulders—with those on the bottom being disadvan-
taged by the full array of factors, up to the very top, where the 
heads of all those disadvantaged by a singular factor brush up 
against the ceiling. Their ceiling is actually the floor above 
which only those who are not disadvantaged in any way reside. 
In efforts to correct some aspects of domination, those above 
the ceiling admit from the basement only those who can say 
that “but for” the ceiling, they too would be in the upper 
room. A hatch is developed through which those placed im-
mediately below can crawl. Yet this hatch is generally availa-
ble only to those who—due to the singularity of their burden 
and their otherwise privileged position relative to those be-
low—are in the position to crawl through. Those who are 
multiply burdened are generally left below unless they can 
somehow pull themselves into the groups that are permitted to 
squeeze through the hatch.
As this analogy translates for Black women, the problem 
is that they can receive protection only to the extent that their 
experiences are recognizably similar to those whose experi-
ences tend to be reflected in antidiscrimination doctrine. If 
Black women cannot conclusively say that “but for” their race 
or “but for” their gender they would be treated differently, 
they are not invited to climb through the hatch but told to 
259. Crenshaw, supra note 2, at 151.
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wait in the unprotected margin until they can be absorbed in-
to the broader, protected categories of race and sex.260
As Crenshaw’s analogy demonstrates, the but-for standard risks under-
mining the purpose of antidiscrimination statutes by limiting redress to 
those who are nearest to the source of privilege and can say that, but for a 
single factor, they too would be above ground.
Absent clear Supreme Court or legislative guidance, however, some 
courts may decide to hold intersectional discrimination plaintiffs to the 
but-for standard. Accordingly, the following section addresses how such 
plaintiffs may satisfy the but-for standard as applied to their intersectional 
claims.
B.  How Can Plaintiffs Prove Their Intersectional Discrimination Claims?
After identifying the applicable causation standard, plaintiffs alleging 
intersectional discrimination must further determine what evidence they 
will have to marshal in order to meet that standard. In cases asserted un-
der the “disparate treatment” legal theory, in which the plaintiff alleges 
that the defendant “simply treats some people less favorably than others”
because of a protected trait,261 some courts require the plaintiff to identify 
an employee without the protected trait who is otherwise similarly situat-
ed and was treated more favorably—unless the plaintiff has an admission 
from the decision maker that his or her actions were based on the animus 
toward the plaintiff because of the plaintiff’s protected trait.262 As the Su-
preme Court’s prior case law and Crenshaw’s intersectionality analysis il-
lustrate, identifying such a comparator is not necessary to prove the dis-
crimination. But even in jurisdictions where plaintiffs are required to 
provide a comparator because they do not have a direct admission from 
the defendant, a plaintiff alleging they were discriminated against because 
they are a person of color with a disability need not be hindered by either 
identity when they are seeking to prove discrimination based on the in-
tersection of both.
260. Id. at 151-52.
261. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52 (2003) (quoting International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)).
262. See e.g., Dickerson v. Bd. of Trs., 657 F.3d 595, 601 (7th Cir. 2011) (ADA case); 
St. Louis v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 60 So.3d 455, 459 (3d Cir. 2011) (Title VII case); Coleman 
v. B-G Maint. Mgmt., 108 F.3d 1199, 1204 (10th Cir. 1997) (Title VII case). But see 
EEOC, Notice No. 915.002, Enforcement Guidance: Unlawful Disparate Treatment of 
Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities n.43 and accompanying text (May 23, 2007), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving.html#fn43 (explaining in accompanying 
text that “while comparative evidence is often useful, it is not necessary to establish a vio-
lation of” disparate treatment based on sex under Title VII).
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The 1999 Olmstead decision, in which the Supreme Court recog-
nized that unnecessary institutionalization of persons with disabilities is a 
form of discrimination, is instructive in determining the types of proof 
intersectional plaintiffs must provide.263 Although Olmstead did not in-
volve claims of intersectional discrimination, this decision rejected the ar-
gument that the plaintiffs could not show they were discriminated against 
under Title II of the ADA because they had “identified no comparison 
class, i.e., no similarly situated individuals given preferential treatment.”264
Instead, Justice Ginsburg explained that “Congress had a more compre-
hensive view of the concept of discrimination advanced in the ADA.”265
The Court rejected Justice Thomas’s argument in dissent that “a plaintiff 
cannot prove ‘discrimination’ by demonstrating that one member of a
particular protected group has been favored over another member of that 
same group,” and his argument that “a finding of discrimination requires 
a comparison of otherwise similarly situated persons who are in different 
groups by reason of certain characteristics provided by statute.”266 In re-
jecting these arguments, the Court embraced an expansive understanding 
of discrimination consistent with intersectionality, even citing Jefferies for 
the proposition that “discrimination against [B]lack females can exist even 
in the absence of discrimination against [B]lack men or [W]hite wom-
en.”267 It also cited an ADEA case for the proposition that “[t]he fact that 
one person in the protected class has lost out to another person in the 
protected class is thus irrelevant, so long as he has lost out because of his 
age.”268
Moreover, the Court has readily found sufficient evidence of dis-
parate treatment without a comparator in certain types of employment 
discrimination cases, such as harassment and stereotyping cases.269 As 
courts and scholars have explained, a plaintiff can prove discrimination by 
pointing to the context of “surrounding circumstances, expectations, and 
relationships,” with “comparison being but one technique among several 
for making that contextual evaluation.”270 Furthermore, in some cases, 
263. Olmstead v. Zimring ex rel. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 598 (1999).
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. See id. at 598 n.10 (majority opinion); id. at 617 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
267. Id. at 598 n.10 (majority opinion) (citing Jefferies v. Harris Cty. Cmty. Action 
Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032 (5th Cir. 1980)).
268. Id. (citing O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996)).
269. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80-81 (1998) 
(sexual harassment by a member of the same sex); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 
228, 235-36, 251-52 (1989) (plurality opinion) (sex stereotyping).
270. Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 782-83 
(2011) (citing Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82); see also Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 
F.3d 456, 467-68 (2d Cir. 2001) (describing the circumstances that imply discriminatory 
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finding a comparator will be impossible because there is no one else who 
is similarly situated to the plaintiff; consider, for instance, an employee 
with a unique position, like an organization’s CEO, or one in a homoge-
nous workplace where all employees share the protected trait, such as an 
office where all secretaries are female.271 For these reasons, the better-
supported position is that plaintiffs may prove their disparate treatment 
claims even without a similarly situated comparator.
However, plaintiffs in courts that do require proof of a comparator 
can nonetheless succeed in proving intersectional discrimination, alt-
hough “the more specific the composite class in which the plaintiff claims 
membership, the more onerous that ultimate burden [of proving a prima 
facie case of discrimination] becomes.”272 For example, if an intersectional 
plaintiff alleges they were discriminated against because they are a Black 
person with a disability, employers may argue that the plaintiff must iden-
tify a non-Black employee without a disability who was treated more fa-
vorably. Under this argument, it would not suffice to identify both a 
Black employee without a disability and a non-Black employee with a 
disability who were treated more favorably than the plaintiff because nei-
ther would be entirely outside of the plaintiff’s protected class. But this 
argument is not consistent with the “more comprehensive view of the 
concept of discrimination advanced in the ADA,”273 nor is it supported 
by Title VII case law.274
Logic dictates that an intersectional plaintiff required to provide a 
comparator for a disparate treatment claim need not identify a perfect 
counterfactual in order to prove discrimination. Consider, for example, a 
Venn diagram where one circle represents Black employees, one circle 
represents employees with disabilities, and the intersection of both circles 
represents Black employees with disabilities. A plaintiff who alleges that 
they were discriminated against because they exist in this intersection 
could prove that the intersection was the but-for cause of their harms by 
identifying a comparable employee who exists entirely outside of both 
circles, for instance, a White employee with no disabilities, that was 
treated more favorably. But the plaintiff can also demonstrate that this in-
tersection was the but-for cause if they identify a comparable Black em-
intent in the absence of a similarly situated employee, including the employer’s use of 
“degrading” language or “invidious comments” and “the sequence of events leading to 
the plaintiff’s discharge” (quoting Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctr. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 
(2d Cir. 1994))). See also Goldberg, supra, at 779-87.
271. See Goldberg, supra note 270, at 757-61.
272. Jeffers v. Thompson, 264 F. Supp. 2d 314, 327 (D. Md. 2003).
273. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 598.
274. See, e.g., Daniel v. Church’s Chicken, 942 F. Supp. 533, 539 (S.D. Ala. 1996) (Ti-
tle VII case explaining that comparators outside of the Black female plaintiff’s class include 
White males, White females, and Black males).
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ployee without disabilities and a non-Black employee with disabilities 
who were treated more favorably, even if neither of these employees 
were treated as favorably as the most advantaged employee. This is be-
cause such a plaintiff can show that, but for their unique combination of 
protected traits, they would not have experienced the unfavorable treat-
ment. As this hypothetical reveals, allowing only an employee who is ad-
vantaged in every single way that the plaintiff is disadvantaged to serve as 
a comparator obscures the point of the intersectionality analysis: that the 
intersection itself, and not only its separate components, caused the 
harm.275
This is further illustrated by Crenshaw’s basement analogy,276 which 
represents the legal and cultural structures that control who is permitted 
to access spaces of opportunity, and, to paraphrase scholar and activist 
Anna Julia Cooper, “where and when [they] may enter.”277 Some indi-
viduals may be in that basement because of a singular identity or status, 
just out of reach from the opportunity that lies above and standing on the 
shoulders of others who are even farther away from opportunity. The in-
dividual on the bottom of the basement may not often be able to prove 
that absent a particular component of their intersectional identity—e.g., 
their race or gender or disability—they would be above ground. But such 
an individual can readily prove that absent their position at the intersec-
tion of various identities, they would not have the weight of so many 
others bearing down on them, further distancing them from opportunity. 
That individual experiences discrimination not only because they are in 
the basement, but also because they are positioned under the weight of 
other, relatively more advantaged individuals. As Part Two of this Article 
illustrates, Junius Wilson may very well have been subjected to incarcera-
tion, sterilization, and institutionalization if he had been a Black person 
without disabilities or a White person with disabilities. Yet, it is nearly 
certain that he would not have been quite so far below ground, where he 
was forgotten for sixty-eight years, but for the fact that he was a Black 
deaf man. But for his position at the intersection of race and disability, he 
too might have been just grazing the ceiling, with a chance to crawl 
through the hatch.
275. See Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1562 (9th Cir. 1994) (“When a plaintiff 
is claiming race and sex bias, it is necessary to determine whether the employer discrimi-
nates on the basis of that combination of factors, not just whether it discriminates against 
people of the same race or of the same sex.”).
276. See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
277. See ANNA JULIA COOPER, A VOICE FROM THE SOUTH 31 (Xenia, Ohio, Aldine 
Printing House 1892).
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C.  What Kinds of Intersectional Discrimination Claims Might Plaintiffs Bring?
Evaluating the potential for intersectional discrimination claims 
based on race and disability further requires considering the contexts in 
which a plaintiff may assert this type of claim. The following section 
therefore describes several fact patterns—some hypothetical and some re-
al—that illustrate the various contexts in which a plaintiff’s experience of 
workplace discrimination is characterized not only by their race or disa-
bility, but by the intersection of both.
One context in which race and disability may intersect to cause 
employment discrimination is where the plaintiff’s status as a person with 
a disability is in question because of race-based assumptions and stereo-
types. The definition of disability under the ADA as an impairment that 
substantially impacts a major life activity is meant to be construed broad-
ly.278 It includes having “a record of such an impairment” and “being re-
garded as having such an impairment.”279 Pursuant to the implementing 
regulation, the standard for determining whether an individual has a disa-
bility under the ADA is “not meant to be a demanding standard.”280
Though it requires an individualized assessment, “the threshold issue of 
whether an impairment ‘substantially limits’ a major life activity should 
not demand extensive analysis.”281 However, a review of federal cases in 
which the plaintiff asserted separate claims under both Title VII and the 
ADA reveals instances in which employers have dismissed a Black em-
ployee’s assertions of a physical disability and instead regarded them as a 
person with a mental health disability, reflecting the implicit biases about 
Black disabled bodies discussed in Part Two.282
For example, in Caldwell v. Nodiff, the plaintiff, a Black female po-
lice officer, asserted separate discrimination claims on the basis of her 
race, gender, and disability under Title VII and the ADA.283 Following 
her diagnosis with hypertension, her supervisor commented that she was 
using too much sick time and placed her on the Sick Abuse list, even 
though she had submitted doctors’ notes regarding her absences.284 Her 
symptoms worsened and she was diagnosed with severe hypertension, 
which required her to use more sick time.285 A new supervisor began 
278. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2012).
279. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (2012).
280. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i) (2012).
281. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j)(1)(iii), (iv) (2018).
282. See supra pp. 36-40.
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“‘harassing’ [the] plaintiff about her use of sick days and repeatedly asked 
[the] plaintiff if she was being domestically abused, if she was on drugs, 
and if she had a drinking problem.”286 The plaintiff “was sick checked at 
her home multiple times, unlike other officers with similar numbers of 
hours worked,” and she lost vacation/sick time when she left for doctor’s 
appointments, “whereas other officers did not lose such time.”287
She complained about her treatment to a supervisor, who told the 
plaintiff that she was “emotionally distressed” and “then took [the] plain-
tiff, involuntarily, to a mental-health facility, where she was released 
within ten minutes.”288 Days later, the plaintiff’s supervisor took her fire-
arm away on the ground that she was “mentally unable to carry a weap-
on,” and sent her home from work the following day “because she had 
been deemed a ‘mentally unstable person.’ ”289 The plaintiff was prohibit-
ed from returning to work until she was able to meet with a department 
psychiatrist nearly eight weeks later, who immediately returned her to 
work.290 On her first day back, her supervisor said that she could no long-
er call out sick and told her he “didn’t care” when she explained the 
symptoms of her hypertension.291 Over the next few years, the plaintiff 
was repeatedly sick checked at her home, while her male nondisabled 
coworkers were not sick checked when they called out sick.292 In addi-
tion, she was repeatedly subjected to drug tests, whereas “officers who 
were out sick, but did not have disabilities, or who were not [B]lack or 
female, did not get drug tested so frequently.”293 Eventually, one of the 
plaintiff’s supervisors advised her that another supervisor “wanted her 
medically evaluated because he did not believe she was disabled with hy-
pertension.”294 The plaintiff became sick again, and while she was in the 
hospital, the supervisor who questioned her disability reassigned her to 
the day shift, even though she had twice requested to remain on the 
night shift so that she could attend doctors’ appointments and get ade-
quate sleep.295 Her high blood pressure and hypertension ultimately pre-




289. Caldwell, 2014 WL 641356, at *1.
290. Id.




295. Caldwell, 2014 WL 641356, at *2.
296. Id.
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Although this plaintiff did not assert an intersectional discrimination 
claim, the district court held that she had sufficiently stated plausible 
claims separately under Title VII and the ADA.297 The court specifically 
rejected the defendants’ argument that the plaintiff failed to state a claim 
because she “d[id] not allege that other [W]hite, male, non-disabled em-
ployees were treated differently.”298 Rather, the court held that “[a] plain-
tiff is not required to show someone outside her protected group was 
treated dissimilarly,” and that she “need show only ‘some causal nexus 
between h[er] membership in a protected class’ and the employer’s ad-
verse action.”299 The court accepted as evidence of such causal nexus the 
plaintiff’s allegations that she was drug tested more often than officers 
who were neither disabled nor Black nor female, and that she was sick 
checked more often than nondisabled male officers. 300 Furthermore, the 
drug tests and sick checks were both in violation of the department’s pol-
icies.301 Caldwell illustrates that a plaintiff who asserts discrimination based 
on multiple protected traits need not identify an exact mirror-image as 
counterfactual. It is enough for such a plaintiff to show that the intersec-
tion of their various identities has placed them under the weight of others 
at the bottom of the basement.
The facts of Caldwell are similar to an Eighth Circuit decision in 
which a Black woman was again assumed to be mentally ill following her 
request to be accommodated for a physical disability. In Norman v. Union 
Pacific Railroad Company, plaintiff Kimberly Norman was a Black woman 
who worked as a train dispatcher.302 Her company offered long-term dis-
ability benefits that were limited to twelve months in duration for em-
ployees with a mental illness or nervous disorder, but unlimited for em-
ployees with other disabilities.303 Norman sought long-term benefits after 
she was diagnosed with irritable bowel syndrome and also requested spe-
cific accommodations.304 Her employer approved the long-term benefits, 
but denied her requests for accommodations.305 In addition, “[s]hortly af-
ter the diagnosis, the company questioned whether Norman’s disability 
was caused by mental illness” and “demanded that Norman undergo an 
independent medical examination.”306 She complied with the request but 
297. Id. at *6.
298. Id. (internal citations omitted).
299. Id. (second alteration in original) (internal citations omitted).
300. Id.
301. Caldwell, 2014 WL 641356, at *6.
302. Norman v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 606 F.3d 455, 457 (8th Cir. 2010).
303. Id.
304. Id. at 457-58.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 458.
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did not hear from her employer again until she received a letter explain-
ing that her long-term benefits had expired due to the twelve-month 
limit on benefits relating to a mental illness.307 The company instructed 
Norman to submit a release signed by her physician showing that she was 
fit to return to work.308 Norman instead appealed the termination of her 
benefits, arguing that her disability was physical rather than mental.309
Eventually, the company agreed that she was entitled to continued bene-
fits due to her physical condition and extended her benefits for several 
months.310 Nonetheless, the company refused to reinstate Norman on the 
ground that she had not submitted the return-to-work release.311
Norman filed suit separately alleging race, gender, and disability dis-
crimination under Title VII and the ADA, asserting that her employer 
treated a White male train dispatcher more favorably when he was in fact 
diagnosed with a mental health disability.312 The Eighth Circuit affirmed
the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the employer on both 
claims, finding that Norman’s failure to submit the release defeated her 
claim that she was terminated because of her perceived mental health dis-
ability.313 For the same reason, the court held that Norman could not 
prove that she was similarly situated to her White male coworker under 
Title VII because, unlike Norman, he had submitted the release.314
Although Norman’s claims were ultimately unsuccessful due to her 
failure to submit the release, the Eighth Circuit found that she sufficiently 
established that she was regarded as a person with a disability under the 
ADA because her employer “mistakenly regarded Norman as mentally 
ill.”315 However, by asserting that the employer “mistakenly” regarded 
Norman as having a mental health disability, the court is perhaps more 
charitable towards the employer than necessary. Indeed, as the court 
points out, Norman “sought medical treatment exclusively for physical 
ailments, underwent a psychiatric evaluation only because [the employer] 
demanded it, and never received an independent diagnosis of mental ill-
ness.”316 Whether due to the way the claims were framed or the court’s 
own understanding of the claims, the analysis of Norman’s ADA claim is 
devoid of any consideration of the role that her race may have played in 
307. Id.
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the employer’s perception of her as mentally ill. The court assumes the 
employer’s conduct to be nothing more than a mistake without evaluat-
ing whether it may have occurred precisely because Norman was a Black 
woman asserting her right to a reasonable accommodation for a physical 
disability. Reading race out of the employer’s conduct in turn erases the 
possibility that Norman was discriminated against because she stood at 
the intersection of race, disability, and gender. Though doing so likely 
would not have saved Norman’s claims in this instance, this case illus-
trates the types of circumstances in which plaintiffs should marshal sup-
porting evidence and call upon courts to consider whether intersectional 
discrimination best explains their harms.
One can readily imagine other contexts in which a plaintiff may as-
sert intersectional discrimination on the basis of race and disability in the 
workplace. For example, consider a restaurant that has a policy of refus-
ing to hire individuals who are HIV-positive based on a fear that 
HIV/AIDS can be transmitted through food. The restaurant management 
further assumes that Black people are more likely than others to have 
HIV/AIDS, and thus turns away Black jobseekers while allowing non-
Black jobseekers to proceed to the next stage in hiring. The ADA per-
mits an employer to impose standards requiring that “an individual shall 
not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the 
workplace,”317 but the determination as to whether the individual poses 
such a threat “shall be based on an individualized assessment of the indi-
vidual’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the 
job.”318 The restaurant’s blanket policy of refusing to hire HIV-positive 
individuals without first making an individualized assessment of their abil-
ity to perform the essential job functions violates the ADA.319 Further, by 
rejecting the Black prospective employees, the restaurant also violates Ti-
tle VII’s prohibition on failing or refusing to hire an individual because of 
their race.320 Finally, it violates both laws by rejecting job applicants be-
cause of the intersection of their race and their—real or perceived—
disability. As with many of the individuals described in the first half of 
this paper, the Black prospective employees, both those who are HIV-
positive and those who are simply regarded as being HIV-positive, exist 
317. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) (2008), see also 42 U.S.C. §12113(b) (2008) (defining “direct 
threat” as “a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by 
reasonable accommodation”).
318. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (2018).
319. See EEOC, How to Comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act: A Guide for Res-
taurants and Other Food Service Employers ex. 13, https://www.eeoc.gov/facts/restaurant_
guide.html#n_4_ (last modified Sept. 29, 2014) [hereinafter EEOC Guide for Restau-
rants].
320. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
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at the crossroads of multiple discriminatory assumptions. The employer 
assumes they are more likely to have the disability because of their race 
and further assumes they are more threatening to others because of that 
disability. By asserting an intersectional discrimination claim, such a 
plaintiff can better explain the forces that have combined to cause them 
harm.
The context of providing reasonable accommodations for a disabil-
ity further exemplifies how intersectional discrimination based on race 
and disability may manifest in the workplace. Race-based stereotypes and 
assumptions may directly cause a failure to accommodate. Consider, for 
example, an employer who thinks that Black people are lazy and refuses a 
Black employee’s requests for a modified schedule or restructured job du-
ties related to a disability because the employer assumes the employee is 
malingering. Or imagine an employer who thinks Black people have bad 
attitudes and are more aggressive, and therefore declines to participate in 
the informal, interactive process that the ADA contemplates employees 
and employers will engage in to determine the appropriate accommoda-
tions.321 As these examples illustrate, the intersectional discrimination 
framework presents an opportunity for plaintiffs to seek redress for more 
complex forms of discrimination. The following section examines the na-
ture of such redress.
D. What Types of Remedies Can Redress Intersectional Discrimination?
Some may question the benefits of asserting an intersectional dis-
crimination claim under Title VII and the ADA if doing so brings the 
same remedies as if one had simply filed separate claims under either stat-
ute; Professor Crenshaw’s intersectionality framework offers an answer. 
In her basement analogy, Crenshaw describes a hatch that is “generally 
available only to those who—due to the singularity of their burden and 
their otherwise privileged position relative to those below—are in the 
position to crawl through. . . Those who are multiply burdened are gen-
erally left below unless they can somehow pull themselves into the 
groups that are permitted to squeeze through the hatch.”322 Crenshaw’s 
analogy reveals that if a remedy is extended only to the persons nearest 
the hatch, the others who have been harmed and deserve redress will in-
evitably be left behind. Adequately remedying the harms of intersectional 
discrimination based on race and disability requires something different 
than if the person had been singularly harmed by discrimination based on 
either race or disability. The dynamics of intersectionality are thus critical 
321. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2018).
322. Crenshaw, supra note 2, at 152
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to crafting legal remedies because if courts overlook the unique harms 
that those in the intersection experience, the remedies they provide will 
leave some who proved their claims “to wait in the unprotected mar-
gin.”323 A remedy so limited is little remedy at all.
For example, an employer found liable for having a general policy 
against providing sign language interpreters to its employees as a reasona-
ble accommodation may try to remedy that discrimination by providing 
American Sign Language interpreters. But such a remedy will be of lim-
ited benefit to someone who, like Junius Wilson, was taught to com-
municate using a form of sign language specific to Black Americans. 
While it is true that any remedy for an employer’s failure to accommo-
date must be tailored to the employee’s individual needs, intersectionality
analysis usefully forces the individualization that is at the heart of the 
ADA. Furthermore, intersectionality analysis also has the potential to 
prompt remedies that incorporate diverse perspectives into the employ-
er’s decision-making before further harm occurs. For instance, a court 
may order an employer to provide training to its human resources staff on 
topics like how to assess whether an employee poses a direct threat or 
how to identify reasonable accommodations during the interactive pro-
cess. However, such trainings will be lacking unless they also consider the 
role that an employee’s race plays in whether they are perceived as 
threatening or whether they are believed when they seek a provider’s 
help for a disabling condition. By making courts and employers 
acknowledge the intersectional plaintiff and specifically address their 
harms, rather than barreling through or swerving around the intersection, 
plaintiffs and advocates can guard against shallow and ineffective legal 
remedies.
Additionally, monetary damages can be a powerful tool for chang-
ing employers’ incentives and prompting organizational change, but the 
assessment of damages will be incomplete if courts do not consider the 
specific harms that come from being discriminated against due to the in-
tersection of multiple identities. Both Title VII and the ADA generally 
authorize compensatory damages,324 which are designed to compensate 
the plaintiff for their economic losses and emotional harms.325 To achieve 
this purpose, however, courts assessing compensatory damages must give 
323. Id.
324. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 
12117(a) (2012).
325. See EEOC, Enforcement Guidance: Compensatory and Punitive Damages Available under 
§ 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (1992), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/
damages.html (Title VII and the ADA also authorize punitive damages, which are 
“awarded to punish the respondent and deter future discriminatory conduct.”); See also 42
U.S.C. § 1981a (2012).
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careful consideration to the complex and compound forms of harm that 
plaintiffs subjected to intersectional discrimination experience.
For example, in her essay regarding the stigma she faced seeking and 
receiving treatment for depression and bulimia, Latria Graham describes 
being told by her family that her eating disorder was a “[W]hite girl’s 
problem,” and further experiencing a “series of micro-aggressions from 
therapists and other patients” based on her race.326 Additionally, recent 
research suggests that psychotherapists consider the patient’s presumed 
race, gender, and class when offering appointments. According to the re-
search, “an identifiably [B]lack, working-class man would have to call 80 
therapists before he was offered a weekday evening appointment,”
whereas a “middle-class [W]hite woman would only have to call five.”327
The EEOC considers psychiatric expenses as among the types of harms 
that can be remedied with compensatory damages.328 But this begs the 
question of whether a person of color with disabilities will be further 
compensated for the anguish they face wrestling with whether to even 
seek treatment for a “[W]hite person’s disability” or for the added stress 
and inconvenience of being denied an appointment or for the exacerba-
tion of their distress due to a lack of culturally competent care.329 If courts 
evaluate claims for damages without also considering whether these types 
of harms are attributable to the employer’s conduct, then they will risk 
inadequately compensating individuals who have indeed been harmed.
While the remedies for intersectional discrimination claims may be 
of the same form as for other claims—declaratory, injunctive, and mone-
tary relief—the intersectionality framework meaningfully informs what it 
means for a plaintiff to have their harms truly redressed. Importantly, alt-
hough plaintiffs must carefully articulate their claims and put forth ade-
quate supporting evidence, the responsibility for achieving more robust 
remedies for intersectional discrimination does not rest on plaintiffs alone, 
especially since many plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases are 
326. Latria Graham, The Stigma of Being Black and Mentally Ill: How Racism is Preventing 
Me from Getting the Help I Need, ELLE (Apr. 9, 2016), http://www.elle.com/culture/
a35487/racism-and-stigma-mental-health/.
327. Olga Khazan, Not White, Not Rich, and Seeking Therapy, THE ATLANTIC (June 1, 
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/06/the-struggle-of-seeking-
therapy-while-poor/484970/; accord Heather Kugelmass, “Sorry, I’m Not Accepting New 
Patients” An Audit Study of Access to Mental Health Care, 57 J. OF HEALTH & SOCIAL 
BEHAVIOR 168, 169 (2016).
328. See EEOC Guide to Restaurants, supra note 319.
329. Notably, Black Americans are less than half as likely (7.6 percent) as White Ameri-
cans (16.6 percent) to have used a mental health service in the past year. U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN.,
RESULTS FROM THE 2011 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH: MENTAL 
HEALTH FINDINGS  21 (2012).
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pro se.330 Courts must take special care to avoid flattening these claims in-
to claims based on a single protected trait in their effort to ascertain the 
cause of plaintiffs’ harms.
IV.  CONCLUSION
This Article makes the case for why intersectional discrimination 
claims based on race and disability are important and how courts and liti-
gants should go about considering such claims in the context of employ-
ment discrimination. The intersectionality framework teaches that people 
of color with disabilities are sometimes subject to discrimination that mir-
rors the discrimination experienced by people of color without disabilities 
and sometimes mirrors the discrimination experienced by White people 
with disabilities. And, at other times, they experience discrimination that 
mirrors neither, because it is the unique product of their race and disabil-
ity together. While proving intersectional discrimination claims may be 
challenging given the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the applicable 
causation standards, plaintiffs held to the more demanding but-for stand-
ard can prove their claim by showing that they would not have been 
treated unfavorably absent the specific nexus of their race and disability.
Litigating such claims is a worthwhile endeavor because limiting a 
plaintiff to asserting that they were discriminated against either because of 
race or because of disability, but not because of both operating together, 
erases an important perspective on the complex nature of discrimination 
and threatens to lead to shallow or misinformed legal remedies. While 
this Article focuses in particular on the context of employment discrimi-
nation, extending this analysis to other areas of the law where race and 
disability intersect will be an important next step for advancing antidis-
crimination law.
Finally, it is important to note that the above analysis of how to ro-
bustly protect the civil rights of the individual who experiences intersec-
tional discrimination because they exist at the bottom of Kimberelé 
Crenshaw’s basement is not simply an exercise in altruism. Instead, as 
Crenshaw and others before her have counseled, it is a recognition of the 
fact that the civil rights of all Americans are yoked together, and thus we 
330. See LAURA BETH NIELSEN ET AL., AM. B. FOUND., CONTESTING WORKPLACE 
DISCRIMINATION IN COURT: CHARACTERISTICS AND OUTCOMES OF FEDERAL 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION 1987-2003, 13 fig.2.14 (2008), 
http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/nielsen_abf_edl_report
_08_final.pdf (23 percent of employment discrimination cases are filed by pro se plain-
tiffs).
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are all better served by the vigorous enforcement of antidiscrimination 
laws.  Or, as Crenshaw puts it: “When they enter, we all enter.”331
331. Crenshaw, supra note 2, at 167.
